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FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE WESTERN APACHES
1848-1886
By RALPH H. OGLE
CHAPTER

III

EXTERMINATION-A FRONTIER PANACEA

of the Civil War resulted in a temporary disT
ruption and weakening of the military organization in
the Apache country.· This situation was produced by a
HE END

gradual mustering out of the California Volunteers and an
order from the war department which ended the enlistment
of new troops. To prevent the complete collapse of military
control on the Apache frontier, the secretary of war made
an exception to the order on May 20, 1865, and allowed the
recruitment of a regiment of Arizona Volunteers. Six companies composed of a total of three hundred and fifty men
were immediately enrolled under the supervision of General
McDowell. Half of the new troops were posted in southern
Arizona and the others were moved to the Prescott area.!
No military activity occurred in Arizona until McDowell visited the district in December. Then the advantage of having the department commander close at hand
became very apparent. First, certain groups of Pinals and
Coyoteros that had practically cut off the delivery of supplies to Fort Goodwin, were easily overawed by commands
sent out from Camp Grant. 2 Next, all the Arizona Volunteers were concentrated at Camp Lincoln for service in the
Verde Valley. The government gave scant attention to the
troops' needs and much hardship resulted; however, their
activities were quite effective. On February 11, 1866, Lieutenant Manuel Gallegos with forty-five men moved down the
1. Dept. of California, Annual RepOrt, 1886, A. G. 0., 632; Report of the Adjutant-General, Oct. 1, 1866, in Journal of the Third Legislative Assembly, Pp. 250-254.
One hundred and eighty-eight of the Arizona Volunteers were Maricopa Indians.
2. Col. T. F. Wright to A. A. G., Jan. 24, 1866, Dept. of Calif., Annual Report,
1886, A. G. 0., 632.
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valley after a band of marauders. The command, operating
only at night, succeeded in locating a large rancheria strongly
fortified within a series of caves and caverns. A battle of
several hours duration followed, but despite the fact that
thirty warriors were killed and twelve wounded, the band
could not be dislodged. 3 Similar commands led by Lieutenant Thomas Ewing and Primativo Cervantes struck the
Indians north of the Salt River several severe blows in
March, killing forty-two of them and wounding many
others. 4
Such unusual punishment forced the Apache hostiles
into southern Arizona where they renewed their raids with
increased vigor. They probably would have ravaged the
region with impunity had not General McDowell, still in the
district, ordered troops from Fort Grant into action. As a
result, Lieutenant John B. Urmy scoured the region for
eleven days, travelled 225 miles, burnt 250 wickiups and
killed six IIldians from a hostile band he overtook by accident. 5 General McDowell had scarcely started back to his
headquarters, however, when the troops ceased their activities. With the exception of forty-one Indians killed and
captured in the Verde valley in April, no further punishment followed for several months. 6
The breathing spell afforded by the troops' inaction
gave the civil authorities an opportunity to express their
views. Superintendent Leihy was quite critical of the military. Their work, he said, tended to embarrass and complicate the Indian difficulties. He was of the opinion that
one-tenth of their expenditures during the past on "fruitless" operations would have provided comfortable homes
for all the Indians in the territory.7 Delegate Poston stated
that "the military authorities assume to be the government,"
3.
4.
Green,
5.
6.
7.

Capt. H. S. Washburn to A. A. G., Feb. 15, 1866, ibid.
Ewing to Col. C. E. Bennett, Mar. 9, 1866, ibid; Washburn to Capt. John
Mar. 26, 1866, ibid.
Urmy to A. A. G., Mar. 5, 1866, ibid.
Lt. J. D. Walker to Bennett, April 30, 1866, ibid.
Lejhy to D. N. Cooley, May 18, 1866, 1. 0., L 155.
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and more poignantly, he charged that the officers and men
sent to the Indian country were rendered ineffective because of their lack of frontier experience.8 Governor Goodwin wanted "fair, open and persistent war" until the savages were "exterminated" or forced to "bow their necks in
submission." Then they were to be put on reservations and
"made to labor or starve," so there could be "no patched up
treaty to benefit speculators in beef."9 One J. D. Cusenbury
wrote President Johns-on regarding the inadequate number
of troops, the incompetency of the commander and of the
officers' belief in extermination. Such an extreme policy
was favored, he said, because of the lack of any formulated
plans or arrangements for dealing with the Indians in case
they should wish to surrender. Prophetically, he declared
that 10,000 men and several years would be required to kill
all the Apaches; but over-sanguinely, he predicted that
they could be placed on a reserve in one year and made selfsustaining in two. 10
Expediency was still the governing factor, unfortunately, and although the views expressed contained much
truth, yet ideas rather than policies were being advanced.
Leihy came close to a sound policy when he wrote that adequate material provision would bring most of the bands to
the reserves; but he was visionary in his view that such
care would "soon" make them self-sufficient, and that the
"few" remaining out "would be hunted down and killed by
the adventurous prospectors and miners."ll
A reorganization of the army on July 28, 1866, in:"
creased its bureaucratic nature. The country was divided
into military divisions and Arizona, as a district of the Department of California, became a part of the Division of the
Pacific. For purposes of Apache warfare western New
8. Poston to Cooley, May 17, 1866, I. 0., P 132.
9. Goodwin to Cooley, May 17, 1886, ibid.
10. Cusenbury to Andrew Johnson, May I, 1866, P 148.
11. Leihy to Cooley. May 18, 1866, 1. 0., L 155. The citizens of Tucson were
reported to be paying a group of Tame Apaches one hundred dollars for each hostile
scalp brought in. Dr. C. H. Lord to Cooley, June 4, 1866. 39 Cong., 2 sess., IH. E. D.
no. I, vol. ii, p. 112.
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Mexico should have been combined with Arizona, but reasons of economy made it expedient to include the former
area in the Division of the Missouri. The reorganization
further provided for the replacement of all volunteer troops.
with regular army personneJ.12
No important results followed the military reorganization, but McDowell, weakened by the loss of his Arizona
Volunteers, was inclined to use peaceable measures. The
Indians of the Verde Valley, because of their recent punishment, were also inclined towards peace. Colonel Bennett
was therefore ordered to accept them as prisoners of war
at Fort McDowell, where they were to be aided in agriculture. A party had come in on May 28, made arrangements
to surrender most of their fellow tribesmen, and would
have succeeded had not the presence of a strong number of
Pimas frightened them away. Likewise, the presence of
other unfriendly bands near Fort Goodwin had prevented
the Indians of the Verde from collecting there; yet in the
hope that they might later come to Fort McDowell, Bennett
was now ordered to continue negotiations. 13
Conditions in western Arizona had grown worse. The
eight hundred Yavapai who had gone to the Colorado River
Reservation in 1865 14 were thoroughly dissatisfied within
a few months. Poor crops, quarrels with the Mohaves, the
greed and arrogance of the whites, and especially the government's negligence in furnishing subsistence made them
hate the sedentary life. As a result, the entire number in
the spring of 1866 fled back to the mountains of central
12.
39 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D. no. 1, vol. ii, pp. 5, 17.
General H. W. Halleck was given command of the Division of the Pacific, with
instructions from General Grant "to exercise his discretion as to the mode and
manner of preventing Indian hostilities . . . in' the Territory of Arizona." This
carte blanche from Grant was quite in contrast to his action the year before in
curbing the "too extended" plans aimed against the Apaches. Edwin M. Stanton to
James Harlan, July 11, 1866, I. 0., W 377; McDowell to A. A. G., Mar. 23, 1866,
1. 0., Ariz. Misc.
13. MsDowell to A. A. G., Oct. 18, 1866, 39 Cong.,--2 sess., H. E. D., no. 1, voL
~ii,

p. 35 . .

14.

Ct. supra, N. M. HIST. REV., xiv, 363.
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Arizona, there to resume their life of hunting androbbing.15
The Indians would doubtless have refrained from violence had not the freighters and frontiersmen attacked and
killed them at every opportunity. Retaliation followed near
Date Creek in the killing of a prospector and the burning
of a cabin. A posse of citizens from Hardyville immediately
sought revenge by slaughtering ten Yavapai men, including
the head chief Wauba Yuma, and also several women and
children. Such indiscriminate murder of fairly friendly
Indians produced a recurrence of the critical conditions of
the year before. 16 Traffic almost stopped west of Pres:.
cott; trains moved with military escorts. . Lieutenant Oscar
Hutton, sent to the region in July, killed no Indians at first;
but he destroyed their resources and thus made the situation worse by leaving the bands more destitute than beforeP
On August 11 his command and a train he was escorting
through Skull Valley were attacked by one hundred and
fifty impoverished warriors who demanded the contents of
the wagons. A parley followed, but it broke up in a severe
battle in which the Indians were worsted with heavy loss.
Leihy, certain that costly retaliation would follow, considered the victory a defeat. 18 The situation was further
aggravated by the withdrawal and discharge of the Arizona Volunteers at Date Creek and Wickenburg. 19
General McDowell, in the meantime, had become less
certain with regard to a proper Apache policy; yet he believed that the punishment given the Indians was worthwhile, and in August he ordered the regular troops to be
as active as the Arizona Volunteers had been. But that he
also favored pacific methods is shown by his satisfaction
. 15. John Feudge to Leihy, July 31. 1866, 39 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D. no. 1, vol. ii,
p. 111; G. H. Dorr to Leihy, Jan.· 5, 1866, 1. 0., L 5. Chief Cushackama induced
one hundred of his followers to stay on their farms.
16. Leihy to Cooley. April 12, 1866, 1. 0., 1. D.
17. Hutton to P. A., Aug. I, 1866, A. G. 0., 632.
18. The Indian loss was thirty-three killed and fifteen captured. Hutton to
Capt. G. W. Downey, Aug. 14, 1866, A. G. 0., 632. See also Leihy's account, 1. 0.,
L 239.
19. McDowell to A. A. G., Oct. 18, 1866, op. cit.
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with the results attained at Fort Goodwin, where several
hundred Apaches were collected. This attitude of indecision indicated that the general favored both peace and war,
whichever might prove to be the most expedient. 20
The military, from the standpoint of war, made an auspicious start. Captain George R Stanford, in late September, moved from Fort McDowell to Meadow Valley, ninety
miles distant, where an unknown Apache rendezvous was
discovered. He attacked a large rancheria on October' 3,
killed fifteen warriors, captured seven noncombatants and
destroyed their vast store of winter supplies. More important, the ease of the outward march by way of the Sierra
Ancha Range and the equally easy return near the base of
the north Mazatzal Peak proved the feasibility of the new
route into the hostiles' country.21
Captain Stanford led another expedition into the same
.region on November 14. This time he moved his lightly
equipped command of sixty-four men farther on into the
Tonto country. Before the Indians were aware of the intrusion, he attacked one of their large encampments located
in a box canyon thought to be impregnable. The result was
meager-six slain and five captured-but all the bands of
the area were completely discomfited. For several months
they gave no further trouble. 22
At this point the military of southern Arizona took a
forward-looking step, which, unfortunately, met the disapproval of higher authority. Colonel Guido Ilges of Fort
Grant, in accordance with instructions from his immediate
20. Ibid., p. 86.
21. Stanford to A. A. G., Oct. 9, 1866, 40 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D., no. I, vol.
ii: p. 124 et .eq.
The success of the expedition decided Halleck in favor of a forced peace by "a
hunt of extermination." Orders therefore followed for the establishment of a post,
Camp. Reno, in the new area. A trail was also to be projected from Fort McDowell
to the camp. Gen. Orders no. 89, Oct. 81, 1866, ibid., p. 94.
22. 40 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D., no. 1, vol. ii, PP. 188-140.
The Indians of southern Arizona were kept quiet during the year by the establishment of Camp Wallen on Babacomari Creek, and by the operations of Lieutenant
Winters in the Huachuca and Mule Mountains. W. H. Winters to Maj. Harvey Brown,
Dec. 18, 1866, ibid., pp. 141-144.
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superior, Colonel Charles S. Lovell, made a treaty of peace
with several chiefs of the Aravaipa, Tonto and Pinal
Apaches. The Indians agreed on December 20 to settle
upon a reservation where they were to remain at peace, but
they reserved the privilege of making extended hunting
and food-gathering expeditions to supplement the governmental subsistence that Ilges promised them. 23
General McDowell immediately ruled that the treaty
was "irregular, injudicious and embarrassing." He contended that the officers only had authority to grant armistices, and that they had made promises impossible to fulfill.
To keep the chiefs from suspecting perfidy, he recommended
that the peace terms be greatly restricted so that the Indians
without the prescribed reserve limits could be considered
hostiles. General H. W. Halleck sustained McDowell and
ordered him to admonish Lovell and Ilges sharply for their
assumption of authority.24 Both the secretary of the interior and the commissioner of Indian affairs also disapproved of the treaty, but they sanctioned the idea of a peaceful solution and stated that since the reservation system had
been a success with other Indians there was no reason why
it should be unsuccessful with the Apaches. They instructed
the new superintendent to cultivate all chiefs inclined
towards peace. 25
The office of Indian affairs replaced Superintendent
Leihy in September, 1866, with G. W. Dent, General Grant's
brother-in-law. Commissioner Mix, in notifying Dent of
his appointment, requested a full report of conditions in
Arizona. He also asked him to administer his office eco23. Ilges to A. A. G., Dec. 20, 1866, A. G. 0., 163 P.
24. McDowell to A. A. G., Feb. 8, 1867, 1. 0., W 433; A. A. G. to McDowell, Feb.
9, 1867, 'ibid.
25. Secty. of Int. to C. E. Mix, Sept. 7, 1867, 1. 0., Ariz. Misc.; Mix to Secty. of
Int., Sept. 7, 1867. ibid.; Mix to Dent, Sept. 20, 1867, L. B. no. 84, p. 310.
The territorial legislature, probably for economic reasons, opposed peace. They
remonstrated that the feeding system was u a monstrous and most expensive farce. tJ
Journal of Third Legislative Assembly, pp. 43, 261.
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nomically.26 The new appointee took charge on December
19 in the face of a hostile military opposition. Thus irked,
he became quite critical. According to his view, the territory was in a deplorable condition, chiefly because the military's "ostensible demonstration" against the savages was
"purposeless for the public safety." To reduce the hostiles
properly, he advocated an "active, offensive, persistent,
combined and simultaneous war," in which "they should
be hunted to death with fire and famine." One or two such
campaigns would reduce 'them sufficiently for the civil authorities to assume control; other plans, he was certain,
would only intensify the problem. Opposed to McDowell's
view that a lack of subsistence generated the Indians' hostility, he attributed their ferocity to their jealousy of the
whites. 27
The situation in western Arizona soon gave Dent's
statements much weight, for Yavapai and Tonto attacks
on wagon trains became a matter of daily occurrence. R. C.
McCormick, now governor, sent out a force of rangers that
quickly killed a considerable number of the marauders.
This result alarmed the superintendent and he begged for
more regular troops, stating that a general massacre of the
peaceable Indians along the Colorado River would follow,
should it be proved that any of them had joined in the
raids. 28
The military, in fact, had already taken steps to relieve the situation. General J. 1.. Gregg, with a number of
new troops, was placed in command of the District of Pres26. Mix to Dent, Sept. 8, 1866, I. 0 .• Ariz. Misc.
No reasons were found for the change of officials. Leihy did not live to be
relieved. On November 18 he and his clerk, H. C. Evarts, were murdered east of
La Paz by a band of hostiles who thought that the killing of a "great chief" among
the whites would lead to the evacuation of the region. Levi Ruggles to Comm., Nov.
28, 1866, 1. 0., R 219.
27. Dent to L. V. Bogy, Dec. 31, 1866, 1. 0., D 116..
28. Dent to Bogy, Mar. 5, 1867, 1. 0., D 257.
At this time, the inroads of the miners in the Bradshaw Mountains caused two
hundred of the Yavapai to seek peace at Fort Whipple. Since no policies had been
promulgated, the opportunity was lost. Gen. J. 1. Gregg to Dent, April 12, 1867,
Ariz. Misc.
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. cott and the Upper Colorado early in 1867. To guard
against a recurrence of the outrages of 1866, he was instructed to keep commands moving throughout the troubled
area, and a new post, Camp McPherson, was to be established at Date Creek. General McDowell demanded that no
time be lost in waging a vigorous and aggressive war. 29
General Gregg complied in full measure. In April, he
issued orders designating as hostile all Apaches and all Colorado River Indians not found on reserves. He even included
some bands on the California side of the river. Active operations were to start at once and Indians holding passes issued
by the civil authorities were to receive no immunity.30
These drastic orders resulted in a year of military
wrangling practically devoid of constructive results. McDowell decided that wholesale war against a large body
of friendly Indians, facing starvation because of congressional negligence, was inhuman. He therefore declared
Gregg's orders too stringent and directed their modification. 31 Again Gregg erred. His new orders, on June 11,
directed that Indians heretofore hostile were to be considered peaceable except when acting in concert as a tribe.
Isolated attacks and thefts by individuals were not to be
taken as hostile acts, but "as offenses against the common
law, the same as if committed by white citizens." Moreover, he announced that it was impossible to reconcile the
commanding general's present views with those promulgated for the government of the district the year before. 32
29.

16,

23, 1867, 40
14, 1867,

2

1,

Special Orders no.
Jan.
Cong.,
sess., H. E. D. no.
vol.
ii, PP.
McDowell to A. A. G., Sept.
ibid., pp.
Inspector General J. A. Rusling, who visited Fort Whipple during the spring,
sharply criticized the high maintenance costs of the district. Hay was purchased for
per ton, grain for
per bushel, lumber for
per thousand feet, and the cost
of freight from San Francisco was
per ton. Reports indicated that the small,
headquarters building was erected at a cost of
with an additional
for the post flagpole. However, the general advocated a policy of vigorous war. For
a detailed account, see, Farish, vol. v. p.
vol. vi, pp.
Gen. Orders no.
April
1. 0., D
Gen. Orders no.
April
1867. ibid.
•
81. A. A. G., to Gregg, May
1. 0., Ariz. Misc.
Cong.,
sess., H. E. D., no. I, vol. ii, Pp.

113-115;

$60

$12

30.

32. 40

3,

2

$250

299,
23, 1867,

18, 1867,

126-127.

$75

$100,000,

32, 36-40.
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111-113.
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McDowell immediately branded his subordinate as an uncooperative popularity seeker who had seriously injured the
military service. He directed that existing orders of war
against "hostile Indians in Arizona" be carried out, and
to make his disapproval emphatic, issued special orders
setting forth Gregg's mistakes. 33
While the superior officers were thus wasting their time,
some of the subordinates showed commendable zeal. Captain J. M. Williams with eighty men moved from Fort
Whipple, in April, to the upper Verde, where a strong band
of hostiles threatened the region. Two spirited fights followed in which fifty-five savages were killed; these blows
completely disorganized the bands, and practically relieved
Prescott from danger on the east. 34 Likewise, Colonel Ilges
and Captain J. H. Vanderslice, from Fort McDowell, combed
parts of the Tonto, lower Verde and Mazatzal regions.
They accomplished little, although their scouts sharply reduced the horse-stealing forays said to emanate from those
isolated points. 35
The general situation as shown by these scouts perplexed General Gregg. . He found his twenty-seven companies, scattered as they had to be, quite inadequate for the
tasks of subjugation and preservation of peace. The great
size of the district, the roughness Of its terrain, the number
and frequency of desertions, the shortage of citizen employees and the smallness of the posts were insuperable problems to the district commander. But instead of seriously
considering these difficulties, McDowell chided Gregg for
beginning more wars than he could carry out, especially
when the Indians wanted peace. 30 The burden was thus
thrust back into the subordinate's hands, proving that expediency was still the rule of action.
33. McDowell to Gregg, July I, 1867, I. 0., Ariz. Miac.
34. Williams to A. A. G., April 27, 1867, 40 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D. no. I, vol.
ii, pp. 150-153.
35. Ilges to Lt. J. W. Lewis, April 30, 1867, ibid., pp. 153-154; Vanderslice to
Lewis, May 10, 1867, ibid., 154-157.
36. A. A. G. to Gregg, May 18, 1867, op. cit.
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Major Roger Jones was now sent to Arizona to give the
district a thorough investigation and to make recommendations. He was quite appalled with the situation. Men were
killed at various points along his route; stock was stolen
within sight of one post he visited; nothing was safe-much
less so than when he first saw the region in 1857-1859. He
considered the troops practically powerless, and suggested
several radical changes: (1) the organization of Arizona
into a separate department to eliminate the three months'
time required for the transmission of orders to and from
the Presidio; (2) the concentration of the troops at a fewer
number of posts in order to provide more effectives for
scout duty; (3) the provision of facilities to mount the
infantry when the regular cavalry was overburdened; and
(4) the erection of better quarters and hospitals to prevent
inefficiency and desertion. 37
Jones' report was obviously a constructive one, but despite its logical approach towards a military solution of the
Apache problem, McDowell sent Halleck a ten-page letter
of rebuttal on August 14. He denied the soundness of the
major's findings throughout and in an elaborate elucidation
of his own administration justified the existing conditions.
But his sharp analysis of the military problems inadvertently stamped him as a soldier with an attitude of defeat. 38
General Gregg, meanwhile, became an exponent of
pacific methods, and he evinced much concern about certain
peacefully inclined Indians of the Verde and Bradshaw
'regions. Elaborate instructions left him practically unrestricted. He was given full authority to: (1) receive and
support them if they wished to give up; (2) consider them
hostile if they did not surrender; (3) provide for them if
the superintendent could not; or (4) collect, guard and economically ration them in some unsettled locality until the
37. Jones to A. A. G., June 5, 1867, 40 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D. no. '1, vol. ii, p.
101; Jones to Gen. J. B. Fry, July 15, 1867, ibid., pp. 83-84.
38. 40 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D. no. 1, vol. ii, p. 87 et seq. For a detailed discussion .of McDowell's report, see Frank C. Lockwood, The Apache Indians (New
York, 1938), pp. 165-168.
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office of Indian affairs could assume charge. 39 Whatever
results Gregg achieved remain unreported.
General Halleck was next to take up the problem of
Apache control. Moved, doubtless, by the serious conditions
near Prescott, but more perhaps by the critical attitude of
the territorial legislature,40 he made an exhaustive report
to the adjutant general on September 18. He admitted the
weakness of defense in the west, but attributed it to the fact
that only one-ninth of the available strength of the army
was assignd to his extensive division. Of the forty-seven
companies allotted to the Department of California, twentyeight were posted in Arizona, where, he pointed out, the
inadequacy of their numbers had rendered them almost
powerless. Furthermore, he could see no prospects for a
safe and permanent settlement of the troubled region until
the bitterly hostile Indians were either conquered or destroyed. In any case, they would have to be segregated from
the whites and kept under rigid military control. Concentration of troops, he. agreed, would increase their efficiency,
but decentralization was necessary to maintain the small·
scattered settlements upon which the commissary depended.
Additional troops-not less than two or three regiments,
according to his analysis-would be required if the problem
were to be solved.41
Acting Secretary of War U. S. Grant, after a study of
Halleck's report, informed President Johnson in November,
1867, that the Apaches would observe no treaties, agreements or truces. He also remarked that they were the most
hostile of the American Indians. His recommendation that
the tribe be warred upon until they were completely destroyed or made prisoners of war obviously expressed the
dominant view of the federal officials. 42
39. A. A. G. to Gregg, Sept, 10, 1867, 40 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D., no. 1, vol.
ii, pp. 121-122.
40. Arizona Miner, Sept~ 11, 14, 17, 24, 1867; Journal of the Fourth Legisla.
tive Assembly, Pp. 33-38; 83-88.
41. 40 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D., no. 1, vol. iii, pp. 69-74.
42. Ibid., p. 30.
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During the early part of 1868, the military instituted
action in east-central Arizona that set up a constructive
trend not to be stopped until the Apaches were subdued.
First, General T. C. Devin of the Prescott subdistrict decided to clear the savages out of the country along the eastern rim of the Tonto Basin; then he planned to make a campaign into the basin itself, where the marauders reportedly
retreated with their stolen animals and plunder. 43 While
completing details, he sent runners among the Yavapai to
induce them to go to the Colorado river; and, most fortunately, a council was arranged with the notorious Chief
Delchay of the Tontos. 44
,The council was held twenty-five miles east of Fort
McDowell. General Devin offered the Indians peace if they
would confine themselves to an area bounded by the Verde
River, the Black Mesa and the Salt River. Just what agreements were reached are obscure, but in the autumn Delchay
and his Indians actually established themselves at Camp
Reno, where some of them were retained as couriers and
guides. Others found employment gathering hay for the
post contractors. 45
General T. L. Crittenden, simultaneously, made an
agreement with the Camp Grant bands, that superseded the
one made by Colonel Ilges in 1866. However, the Indians
perfidiously broke out as soon as they received a liberal
supply of rations. Crittenden, much irked, still favored
pacific methods; nevertheless, he ordered a mild punitive
expedition into the Tonto Basin, where the culprits were
said to rendezvous. 46
General Devin, accordingly, in late April, moved with a
strong command into the relatively unknown region east of
43. According to reports, most of the stock was later traded for by an unscrupulous class of whites near Fort McDowell and Camp Reno.
44. Devin to Dent, Jan. 5, 1868, I. 0., Ariz. Misc.
45. Devin to A. A. G., Jan. 8, 1868, ibid.; Vincent Colyer to F. R. Brunot (n. d),
1869, 41 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D., no. 1, vol. iii, p. 536.
The contractors paid the Indians one-half cent per pound for the hay and then
sold it to the government for three cents per pound.
46. Crittenden to Dent, Jan. 27, 1868, I. 0., Ariz. Misc.
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Camp Lincoln. He then descended into the basin proper and
for forty-five days unsuccessfully scoured the region. All
trails showed that the elusive Indians had concentrated·
towards the Little Colorado river. This fact convinced the
officers that the hostiles got their munitions from the Zunis
and Navahos. Despite the paucity of results, Devin's observations led him to believe that the most effective way to control the wild bands was to open trails directly into the heart
of their habitats. In fact, he soon made his subdistrict quiet
by this method. 47
.
Meanwhile, Captain Charles A. Whittier, send from the
Presidio, had observed the situation in Arizona at firsthand. Like Jones the year before, Whittier viewed the situation with adverse criticism. He struck at the feeding policy of his superiors, insisting that their maintenance of the
Indians as "Indian prisoners" was a violation of the law.
But he agreed that feeding was a constructive policy and one
that was essential unless the Indians were to be exterminated. As an alternative to the prevailing policy, he suggested the issuance of subsistence paid for by regular appropriations, which method, he insisted, would not only check .
. erratic and .defective .administrative practices, but would
also help to bring in most of the hostile bands. The peacefully inclined bands, he found, were entirely unprotected
from the unreasoning frontiersmen; for this reason he concluded that the government was doing very little to solve
the Apache problem. 48
No constructive policies resulted from Whittier's report, and as the last half of 1868 was reached, the situation
again became serious. Acting Governor H. H. Heath, in a
dilemma, asked the citizens to provide locally for their own
defense. No better method to aCcelerate the indiscriminate
slaughter of Indians could have been devised. 49 This was
47.· Devin to A. A. G., June 12, 1868, 40 Cong., 3 sess., H. E. D. no. 1, vol. iii,
PP. 63-66.
48. Whittier to Fry, June 6, 1868, I. 0., W 1067.
49. Heath to O. H. Browning, July 23, 1868, 40 Cong., 3 sess., H. E. D., no. 1,
vol. ii, pp. 639-640.

26

NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW

immediately demonstrated when the Yavapai, due to severe
epidemics of whooping cough and scarlet fever, moved away
from the Colorado river to the more healthful interior.
Although the Indians promised to return in a short time,
friction with freighters soon developed; and on September
·.25 ten friendly chiefs, including the able Cushackama, were
wantonly murdered near La Paz. Thus at one treacherous
stroke was undone all the significant work of the past. 50
Indian hostility now became widespread. At Fort
Goodwin where several ambuscades and attacks occurred,
. the commandant was authorized to seize and hold all male
Indians as prisoners until every robber and murderer was
delivered up. But the magnitude of the task prevented its
execution. 51 The killing of several whites near Fort Whipple
made the situation equally precarious in the Prescott district, and General E. O. C. Ord, the new commander of the
Department of California, received urged appeals for reenforcements. But the general was handicapped, due to a
decrease in the strength of his companies; therefore, all he
could do was to urge vigorous action with the forces available: Accordingly, twenty-seven scouts were made from the
various posts in the Apache country, but the results were
less than one dead Indian per scout. 52
General Halleck, keenly aware of the critical situation,
once more made constructive suggestions to the secretary of
war. He pointed out that neither proper protection nor
aggressive campaigns could be expected without two addi-·
tional regiments of troops. He also foresaw the need of
Indian scouts in conquering the Apaches, and asked that a
large increase.· be allowed his division. Of greater impor50. Feudge to Dent, Aug. I, 1868, ibid., p. 597; Dent to N. G. Taylor, Oct. 16,
1868, I. 0., D 1606.
Federal Judge H. H. Cartter, who considered it no harm to kill any Indian,
refused to take action against the culprits. Col. L. B. Young to Dent, Oct. 15, 1868,
ibid. Cf. 8upra, footnote 15.
51. A. A. G., to Capt. R. F. O'Beirne, Aug. 8, 1868, 1. 0., Ariz. Misc.
52. Devin to A. A. G., Aug. 28, 1868, 40 Cong., 3 sess., H. E. D. no. I, vol.
iii, PP. 66-68; Ord to A. G., Sept. 27, 1868, ibid., p. 51; Dent to Comm., Dec. I, 1868,
1. 0., D 1690.
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tance, he recommended that Arizona be constituted a separate military department. 53
No important action followed the general's suggestions; consequently, without any definite planning by
responsible officials, the temporizing policy of expediency led
to a chaos of conflicting opinions that reached its height in
1869. Naturally, the frontiersmen were certain that a large
troop increase and a relentless war against the savages
would be a definite solution, but many officials with administrative considerations in their minds were not so assured.
General Ord in showing that a post of one hundred and fifty
men required an annual outlay of $3,000,000 bluntly stated
that war was the economic basis of the territory and that
perhaps it was desirable to reduce "the number of troops in
the country to the minimum consistent with the interests
of the whole countrY."54 In fact, General George Thomas',
support of Ord's views convinced General Sherman that the
occupation of the Southwest was premature and that the
cost of maintenance was out of proportion to the results.
"The best advice I can offer," he wrote, "is to notify the settlers to withdraw and then to withdraw the troops and leave
the country to the aboriginal inhabitants."55
Despite the adverse views of the high military, General
Ord decided against a "temporizing policy." He ordered his
troops to capture, root out and hunt the Apaches as they
would wild animals. All officers were to he promoted in proportion to their success; and he contemplated a concentration of his troops by the evacuation of some of the small
posts that merely "invited" the Indians to attack the government herds and supply trains. 56 Before action could be instipp.

125.

53. Halleck to A. G., Sept. 22. 1868, 40 Cong., 3 sess., H. E. D, no. 1, vol. iii,
49, 147-148.
54. Ord to A. G., Sept. 27, 1869, 41 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D., no. 1, vol. ii, pp. 12455.

7, 1870,

1010

Sherman to W. W. Belknap, Jan.
A. G. 0.,
P.
Such views as Sherman's tended to convince the sentimental East that all Indian
wars should be stopped.
Ord to A. G., Sept.
op. cit., PP.
Weelcly Arizonian,
Mar.

56.
21, 1869.

27, 1869,

121-122;
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tuted the general wavered and decided that the reservation and feeding system rather than war was a more effective way to bring about a reduction of the savages. Colonel
R. F. Bernard was therefore delegated to investigate the
probable success of a reserve for the Apaches. 57
Bernard soon reported that McDowell's experiment at
Camp Goodwin had resulted in failure. But he felt assured
that the Indians would make peaceful and successful farmers if, in addition to annuities, they were allowed a healthy
reserve large enough to afford hunting, planting and the
burning of mescal. 58
The report was scarcely made before conditions
throughout the Apache country became worse than they had
been for many months. The Yavapai stopped commerce in
every part of western Arizona, one hundred whites were
killed in a short time, mails moved under escort, picket posts
had to be maintained near all settlements and the Overland
Route was besieged at all points. Ord, thoroughly. bewildered, was more inclined to use pacific methods than ever
before. He immediately recommended that a suitable reservation be established at a point completely isolated from
the whites. 59
.
As a result of Ord's views, Colonel John Green was sent
into the remote White Mountain country in July, 1869, to
prospect for a suitable reserve location and to select a satisfactory site for a proposed post; ostensibly, hi~ expedition
57. Bernard to Ord, Mar. 23, 1869, I. D., W 260.
58. Ibid., The Weekly Arizonian (Mar. 23, 1869) in pointing out that 2,000
Indians had been simultaneously fed and fought without results for two years, in~
ferred that the war had been "conducted for some distinct motive."
59. Devin to Jones, April (?), 1869, A. G. 0., Old Records Division, Dist. of
Ariz., pp. 104-106; Ord to Secty. of War, April 20, 1869, I. D.
Near Fort Bayard many Mexicans were murdered and travellers were chased
to the immediate grounds of the post. ( New M e",ioan, May 2, 1869. ) The San
Pedro region lost nearly all of the one hundred original settlers who were there in
1867. (Weekly Arizonian, June 19, 1869.) Pima county alone from January 2, 1868,
to July 13, 1869, lost in k.ilIed, captured and wounded about thirteen per cent of its
total population of 5,500.persons. (Ibid., July 17, 24, 1869.) Major Jones informed
General R. B. Marcy on July 21 that 7,300 Apaches, exclusive of the Yavapai and
Pinals, were hostile, and that the region from Prescott into Sonora was completely
paralyzed. A. G. 0., 1010 P.
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was intended as a mild demonstration against the Indians.
The command of one hundred and thirty men had scarcely
penetrated into the southern part of the region before they
learned that the villages to the north were growing heavy
crops of corn. Since the campai.gn was a retaliatory one,
Captain John Barry with sixty men was sent to destroy the
Indians' resources and to exterminate as many of the tribesmen as possible. But Barry was so impressed with their
desire for peace that he ignored his orders, rejoined Green
and was later exonerated. Green as a result of the expedition reiterated his belief in extermination. Yet he insisted
that the Coyoteros, if properly managed and protected by a
post in the region, could easily be placed on a reserve where
they would form a nucleus for the civilization of all the
Apaches. 60
Unfortunately, all the other Apache bands grew more
formidable, and by fall much of the territory was practically
lost to white enterprise. During July the mails were stopped,
the cavalry was frequently forced to retire from the field,
and the Vulture mine at Wickenburg, the sole dependence of
the legislature, was kept open only because General Thomas
ordered continuous scouting between the mine and the
mill. 61 In central Arizona the Toritos resumed their characteristic tactics of thieving and plundering; and Cochise's
bands, in the southeastern part, not only threatened to drive
civilization out, but completely frustrated the troops operating from Fort Bowie. 62 The general situation at the end of
1869 proved that no substantial progress had been made in.
Apache management. 63
60. All accounts of the officers connected with the expedition are printed in 41
Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D. no. 1, vol. iii, p. 544 et seq. Green's findings, especially.'his
proposal that the bands could be induced to fight against each other, were of extraordinary value in later Apache relations.
61. Weekly Arizonian, July 31, Aug. 7, 1869; Green to Parker, Nov. 6, 1869,
I. 0., A 561.
62. Bernard to Devin, Oct. 22, 1869, A. G. 0., 925 P; Weekly Arizonian, Sept. 25,
Oct. 9, 16, 1869; Col. Frank Wheaton to Andrews, Dec. 8, 1869, L 0., Ariz. Misc.
63. The civil authority had exercised little leadership for three years. Superintendent Dent after his appointment late in 1866, appears to have interested himself
in graft. especially in connection with an irrigation project he constructed on the
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The year of 1870 saw the start of a new era in Apache
control. Nothing spectacular was accomplished, but action
was initiated which eventually led to the elimination of the
Apache problem. This activity centered mainly in the creation of Arizona as a separate military department and in
the measures undertaken to control the Coyoteros. Yet the
year began darkly for the settlers, for killings, attacks and
robberies were a matter of daily occurrence. 64
Governor A. P. K. Safford, thoroughly dismayed with
the situation, had already instituted action which permanently affected Indian affairs in the Southwest. During the
previous November, in the East, the governor carefully discussed the Apache problem with numerous federal officials
and New York journalists. Editorials· soon became less'
pacific in tone and the eastern public began to feel horrified
at the continued atrocities of the Apaches. 65 With Territorial Delegate McCormick he presented the case to President Grant, General Sherman and the secretary of war;
McCormick also aired the situation before congress. 66
Meanwhile, on April 15, 1870, the war department made
Arizona and southern California a separate department
with General George Stoneman in command. Reorganiza64. Memorial and Affidavits Showing Outrages Perpetrated by the Apache Indians
tn the Territory of Arizona During the Years 1869 and 1870 (San Francisco, 1871), p. 3.
From July 17, 1869 to July 23, 1870, Pima county lost forty-seven persons killed, six
wounded and one captured.
65. Excerpts printed in Wee/ely Arizonian, Feb. 5, 12, April 30, and July 30,
1870.
66. New York Times, Jan. 17, 1870. McCormick, in striking at New England
opposition to a vigorous Indian policy in the West, aroused much comment when he
sbowed that Cotton Mather had urged the extermination' of the northeastern tribes.
Weekly Arizonian, Sept. 24, 1870.
Colorado River Reservation. Dent generally looked upon Indian management with
a pessimistic attitude, but in keeping a large number of Yavapai. potential marauders
at work, he probably reduced the number of hostilities in western Arizona. The canal
proved to be. a failure and. after much criticism, he resigned on June 'I, 1869. For a
discussion of the episode, see Farish, vol. iv, p. 316 et seq.
Colonel C. S. Andrews, at President Grant's direction, replaced Dent on June
17, 1869. In his first important report he said that no success could be expected
in Indian control until officials were able both to punish and to protect. He foresaw
that the rancor the whites bore for all Indians would greatly impede any civil
program. Andrews to Parker, Dec. 9, 1869, 1. 0., A 629.
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tion necessarily required his first efforts, for the eighteen
expensive isolated posts scattered over the department were
manned by less than one and one-half companies each;
therefore, to make his command effective, he kept the troops
busy for several months building roads to connect the
various posts. Fortunately, General Ord had already practically finished a new road into the White Mountains, and this
fact doubtless explained why Stoneman found the Coyoteros
so pacific and anxious for a reserve. 67
To his superiors Stoneman was not optimistic regarding the future of the Indians. They will "never be entirely
harmless," he wrote, "until they suffer the fate of all the
aboriginals that come in contact with the whites."68 And a
little later he reported that the Indians "must either starve,
steal or be fed; and as they are unwilling to do the former, it
becomes simply a question as to which is the best policy, feed
them or continue to endeavor to prevent them from
stealing."69
The new commander announced his full program in
July: permanent citizen settlements sufficiently large to
protect themselves were to b~ encouraged; camps and troops
were to be concentrated; a widespread drive with citizen
cooperation was contemplllted; mining was to be aided; and
his subordinates were "to regard as hostile all Indians not
known to be friendly." His objective was to make the troops
available for aggressive activity.70
Before the program could be developed, the devastations
of the savages necessitated a number Of isolated actions in
the eastern and southern sections of the territory. The
Yavapai and Tontos were struck effectively on several occasions; in fact, Captain R. F. O'Beirne arranged a peace
agreement with the former which lasted for several months.
Cochise was also punished, and after losing sixty-one of his
braves he retired to Camp Ord where, for several weeks, he
67. Ord to A. A. G., Oct. 10, 1870, A. G. 0., 665 W.
68. Stoneman to A. G., June 2, 1870, 1. 0., A 1074.
69. Stoneman to A. A. G., Oct. 31, 1870, A. G. 0., 711 P.
70. Weekly Arizonian, Aug. 13, 1870.
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enjoyed the full hospitality of Colonel Green. If a definite
official policy had existed to guide Green, the bloody wars
with the Chiricahuas might have been averted. But unfortunately the opportunity slipped and Cochise soon returned
to his former haunts. 71
.
Murder, robbery and destruction now reached greater
proportions in the Chiricahua country than ever before.
From August 7 to 18, twelve men were ki~led, one wounded
and $10,000 worth of property destroyed. Numerous bodies
of cavalry sent out in pursuit were repulsed with sharp
losses by Indians who displayed excellent tactics. Even a
citizen force scouted unsuccessfully. for thirty days.72 The
press, meanwhile, excoriated Stoneman for his lack of
activity, and especially for his action in removing the headquarters from Fort Whipple to Drum Barracks on the Pacific coast. Spurred to action, he issued orders on December
30, which called for "a vigorous persistent and relentless
winter campaign."73 Naturally, the campaign never materialized, for the commander was too distant from the proposed field of action.
Despite the unsatisfactory situation in much of the
Indian country, a program that promised permanent success was already inaugurated· with the strong Coyotero bands. An extensive area in eastern Arizona had, in
fact, been defined and proposed as a permanent reserve for
them a few weeks before the creation of Stoneman's command. According to arrangements the military was to put
the plan in operation; then the office of Indian affairs was
to assume control. 74 General Ord visualized the plan as a
final solution to the Coyotero troubles. He foresaw the bands
permanently isolated, surrounded by white immigration and
forced to pursue agriculture. Such results, he thought,
71. O'Beirne to A. A. G., Oc~. 26, 1870, 1. 0 .. W 1570; Green to A. A. G., Aug.
13, 1870, 1. 0 .• C 631; Weekly Arizonian, July 2, 1870.
72. Ibid., Aug. 6, 13, 27, 1870.
73. Arizona Citizen, Dec. 24, 1870, Mar. 18, 1871.
74. Special Field Orders no. 8, Mar. 5, 1870, 1. 0., Ar;"'. Misc.; Belknap to Cox, .
Mar. 5, 1870, ibid.
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would strongly encourage the wilder bands to seek peace. To
him the only alternative was extermination. 75
The management of the program fell to Colonel Green,
who was well acquainted with the Coyoteros and their habitat. First, he built a road into the center of the region; then
he established a post, Camp Ord, later called Fort Apache, .
at the road's terminils. The Indians, because of their halfstarved condition~ were eager to cooperate, and more than
1,000 of them were present on July 1 for the first count and
beef issue. By winter 2,000 were under control, industriously
cutting hay and wood which were purchased through the
cooperation of General Stoneman. Pointedly, the colonel
informed the commissioner that with subsistence and tools
a life of peace would be made more attractive than one of
war; and that if this result were attained, "their civilization would be a perfect success."76
Stoneman's other subordinates achieved no successes
during the winter,. and the spring of 1871 opened with the
usual picture of distress and woe. In March, the general returned to Arizona and ill-advisedly took steps of economy
which aroused the settlers to extreme fury. One aggressive
move, however, that of a camp in the Pinal Mountains,
frightened 550 of the Arivaipa and Pinals into Fort Grant
for safety; and strangely 1,000 Yavapai came to Camp
Verde in quest of peace. Many of the bands were now in a
position to be thoroughly crushed, but Stoneman, choosing
to control them "through the medium of their bellies," decided to try a policy of peace. He therefore asked for a
supply of meat, corn and blankets with which, he announced,
they could be induced to stay at peace on reservations. 77
Even before the establishment of the new camp, other related groups headed by Chief Eskiminzin had come to Camp
Grant where their sympathetic friend, Lieutenant Royal E.
75.
76.
T. 0., C
77.

Ord to Parker, April 1, 1870, 1. 0., A 104.
Green to ·Parker, July 7, 1870, 1. 0., G 462; Green to A. A. G., Dec. 31, 1870,
631.
Stoneman to Townsend, April 9, 1871, A. G. 0., 1582.
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Whitman, had put them to work cutting hay for the post
contractors. 78
But the leading settlers were in no frame of mind to
allow any entering wedge to their chief means of livelihood
-that of supplying the troops. Almost at once, the territorial press, the governor, the legislature, and almost all
interested groups set up a terrific tirade against the reservation or feeding system, or any other plan that promised
to bring a cessation of hostilities. 79 Indeed, the more unreasoning and aggressive elements merely awaited a pretext to
wreck the Camp Grant experiment.. This ominous situation
was further aggravated by the continued fiendish ravages of
the wild bands in the southeastern Arizona, and in April,
Stoneman was forced to revise his policy into one of mixed
peace and war. He therefore simply announced that the
Indians were to be warred upon until they became willing to
seek peace and safety on the reservations. 80
The policy would doubtless have eased the public feeling
had not a "Committee of Safety" froin Tucson made demands of the general which sharply touched his prerogatives. As a result of his tactless and caustic replies, the
committee publicly announced that "if anything further is
expected we must depend upon our own efforts for its consummation."81 .Subtle intriguers now proclaimed that the
friendly Indians at Camp Grant were responsible for all the
depredations, and that
Stoneman's policy
of peace was the
.
.
sole cause of the trouble; furthermore, a desperate attack on
a wagon train near the post settled the matter from the
frontiersmen's viewpoint. 82
78. Arizona Citizen, Mar. 11, 1871; R. B. I. C., 1871, p. 60. For graft in connection with Whitman's work see, Farish, vol. viii, p. 157; also, Prescott Miner, July
22, 1871.
79. Journals of the Sixth Legislative Assembly, p. 42.
80. General Field Orders no. 2, April 17, 1871, A. G. 0., 1360. Stoneman's action was in agreement with division instructions of August 8,
1. 0., W 1662.
General John Schofield assumed command of the Division of the Pacific in March, 1870.
81. The interview is given in the Weekly Arizonian, April 1. 1871.
82. Capt. Frank Stanwood to Schofield, May 19, 1871, I. O. 368. See also,
R. B. I. C., 1871, pp. 60--67.
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Immediately, the most important citizens of Tucson, led
by W. S. Oury a'nd Jesus Elias, organized an expedition of
one hundred and forty-six men with whom they planned the
most drastic retaliation. Armed and provisioned· by the
territorial adjutant general, the party set out for the Indians' camp on April 28, and two days later succeeded in staging a savage morning attack while the unsuspecting victims
were yet asleep. The gruesome work was soon ended, and
thirty minutes later the party retired without loss up the
San Pedro, leaving behind them eighty-five Indians crushed,
shot and battered to death, seventy-seven of whom were
women and children. Barbarously, twenty-nine children
were carried away into virtual slavery.83
The massacre, while strongly approved in the We'st,
caused great consternation in the East, especially among the
proponents of the peace policy. President Grant, terming
the massacre an outrage, informed Governor Safford that
martial law would be proclaimed in Arizona if the participants were not brought to trial. Accordingly, one hundred
and four men were perfunctorily tried and acquitted in
December. 84
General Stoneman was now blamed by all factions-the
citizens, the "ring" at Tucson and the peace advocates of
the East. Consequently, Safford and McCormick had little
difficulty in obtaining his removal. 85 The general had not
failed, however., Under the most adverse circumstances he
had worked out a policy, a combination of peace and war,
which was later to solve the problem of Apache control.
A policy very similar to that of Stoneman's had simultaneously been developed for the Western Apache bands of
southwestern New Mexico. But the civil authorities in New
6, 1871;
60-68;

30, 1871,

83. Arizona Citizen, May
Whitman to A. A. G.,' April
1. 0.,
A
R. B. I. C.,
pp.
McClintock, vol. i, p.
et seq. Accounts vary
as to the actual number killed. Slightly more than one hundred may have perished.
The Alta California, Feb.
covers the trial completely. J. B. Allen,
who outfitted the expedition, served as a member of the jury.
85. Arizona Citizen, May.
Richardson and Rister, The Greater South-

326.

1871,

84.

west, p.

3, 1872,

322.

20, 1871;
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Mexico, in contrast to those of Arizona, played a most significant part in the formation of the policy. For three years
following the Civil War, the impoverished New Mexican
bands had kept up destructive hostilities sufficiently extensive in the eyes of General John Pope to necessitate the
maintenance of Fort Cummings at Cook's Springs, Fort Selden on the Rio Grande, Fort Stanton on the Bonito, and Fort
Bayard near Silver City. Besides, numerous temporary
posts were opened to prevent the abandonment of many
widely separated settlements. One officer even felt th~t if
the Apache raids east were to be prevented, a cordon of forts
would be required from the Navaho country to Foit- Bayard. 86 On several occasions the civil officials fruitlessly suggested that supplies and a reservation would make the hostiles docile within a year'~ time. 87 '
This unsatisfactory condition prevailed until August,
1869, when Governor R. B. Mitchell; alarmed at the increased temerity of the Apaches, issued a proclamation
which designated them as outlaws subject to be killed if
found away from reservations. 88 High offiicals immediately
announced that the proclamation would interfere with ,a
contemplated permanent Indian policy, and ordered Superintendent William Clinton not to allow its "propriety or
expediency." . Serious complications would doubtless have
arisen, but a. change in governors resulted in a new proclamation with less drastic provisions. 89
This imbroglio, fortunately, had a positive effect on
Apache control, for the commissioner now decided that peace
could best be attained through the civil authority. Accordingly, Lieutenant Charles E. Drew took charge of the Southern Apaches on August 23. Drew spent several weeks with 86. Pope to Sherman, Aug. 11, 1866, 39 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D.
29; Daily New Me",ican, Nov. 17, 1868.
87. 40 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D., no. 1, vol. iii, p. 193; 40 Cong.,
no. 1, vol. ii. pp. 620, 635.
88. Proclamation. Aug. 2, 1869, I. 0., N. Me",., A 329.
89. Parker to W. T. Otto, Aug. 14, 1869, R. B. no 18, p.
Clinton,< Aug. 16, 1869, L. B. no. 92, pp. 73-75; 41 Cong., 2 sess., H.
iii, p. 699.

no. 1, vol. iii, p.
3 sess., H. E. D.

492; Parker to
E. D. no. 1, vol.
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the Indians and found that Loco and his followers were
anxious for peace. They desired to plant their crops near
their old reservation site, but demanded the right to hunt
over a vast area that extended even east of the Rio Grande.
Sagaciously, the agent urged his superiors to make "judicious arrangements."oo
The Indians became more destitute as cold weather
approached and the agent realized that if peace were not
made devastations would reach great proportions during the
winter. Therefore, on October 10 he met Chief Loco at
Canada Alamosa for a peace powwow. In addition to Loco,
Chiefs Victorio, Lopez, Chastine and several Mescalero
leaders were present. This fact indicated to Drew that the
bands through cooperation were becoming more formidable.
An agreement was made whereby Loco was to collect the
groups and hold them at peace near Canada Alamosa, while
Drew was to do his utmost to get the "Great White Father"
to furnish food and clothing. 01
The chiefs adhered faithfully to their agreement; but
as weeks passed with only half rations available, the bands
grew more threatening, especially when they realized they
were likely to be attacked by groups of citizens opposed to
any plan that promised peace.92 Yet Drew held the Indians
fast. He visited their camps frequently, reassured them of
the government~s intent, and sometimes showed his trust by·
staying overnight with them. Finally, on January. 5, 1870,
just at the moment when he despaired, word was received
that the office of Indian affairs had allowed $2,800 to meet
the agreement of the past October. 93 An outbreak was thus
prevented; moreover, with the favorable example of the
Navahos before them,04 and with many bad whites and MexDrew to Clinton, Sept. 29, 1869, ibid., pp. 690-691.
Drew to Clinton, Oct. 11, 1860, r. 0., C 612.
Drew to Clinton, Dec. 12, 1860, I. 0., C 801.
Drew to Clinton, Jan. 5, 1870, r. C., N. Me",., C 840; Gen. G. W. Getty to
Mo., Jan. 4, 1870, ibid., C 664.
Frank D. Reeve, "Federal Indian Policy in New Mexico, 1858:1880," in N ..
RIST. REV., xiii, pp. 36 et seq.

90.
91.
92.
93.
Dept. of
94.
MEX.
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icans around them, the Apaches had other strong reasons
for choosing peace. By October, 1870, seven hundred and
ninety Indians, including .Cochise and some of his bands, had
collected at Canada Alamosa. 95
A constructive conference soon followed between Cochise and W.·F. M. Arny, a special agent sent out to count
the bands and to promote peace. 96 The chief was eager "to
hear what the Great Father had to say," but indicated that
his bands were desirous of peace and security. He promised
to bring in all his braves and keep them at peace, provided
the government would furnish provisions and clothing.
Arny, unauthorized to make an agreement, reported to the
commissioner that the time was most opportune for a permanent peace if the government really cared to take the
necessary steps. He recommended a general issue of one
thousand blankets to the bands as well as a small, daily
ration issue to each Indian who would remain at the agency
during the winter. He also recommended the establishment
of a permanent reserve far out in the Apache country where
the various groups would be thoroughly isolated from the
contaminating influences and liquors of the unscrupulous
whites. No treaty was to be made, the reservation was to be
surveyed, and agency buildings were to be erected. The Indians were then to be cared for on the reserve and those who
stayed away were to be "considered as at war" and "dealt
with accordingly." Until arrangements could be completed,
he advocated a continuance of the feeding policy at Canada
Alamosa. His plan, he felt, was the only one that would prevent the ultimate extermination of the savages. 97 No less
important were the views of the new agent, A. G. Hennisee,
who predicted that if the plan were properly supported 2,000
Apach~s would be at peace by the end of the year. 98
95. Pope to A. A. G., Oct. 31, 1870, 41 Cong., 3 sess., H. E. D. no. I, pt. ii, p. 8;
Lt. A. G. Hennisee to Clinton, Oct. 22, 1870, 1. 0., N. Me",., C 1866.
96. Parker to Clinton, Mar. 26, 1870 (n. f.).
97. Arny to Parker, Oct. 24, 1870, 1. 0., N. Me",., A 1502; same to same, Nov. 5,
1870, ibid., A 1518. Cochise reported that many of his braves had fallen and that
the women greatly outnumbered the men. Ibid., 1579.
98. Hennisee to Clinton, Oct. 31, 1870, R. B. I. C., 1870, p. 104. Hennisee became
agent following Drew's death on June 5, 1870.
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These field reports aroused keen interest among Washington officials. Vincent Colyer, secretary of the board of
Indian commissioners, informed Secretary Delano that
Hennisee's success demonstrated "beyond question" that
with larger appropriations "the whole of the Apaches might,
long before this, have been brought into peaceful relations
with the government." Delano, now convinced that feeding
was cheaper than military action, asked at once for $30,000
to "subsist, maintain peace, and promote civilization among
them."99 Since no funds were available for diversion from
the regular channels, President Grant, on December 23,
shifted the burden of feeding the Indians to General G. W.
Getty of the District of New Mexico. 10o This decision now
left the field clear throughout the Apache country for a trial
of the president's "Peace Policy."
99. Colyer to Delano, Dec. 17, 1870, ibid., p. 102; Delano to A. A. Sargent, Dec.
19, 1870, ibid., p. 101.
100. Colyer to Gen. E. D. Townsend, Dec. 24, 1870, 1. 0., N. Me",., A 1598; Executive Order of Dec. 23, 1870, R. B. I. C., 1870, p. 103.
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CHAPTER

IV

THE GOVERNMENT'S THORNY PEACE POLICY

The report of the Indian peace commission of 1867
aroused the whole country to the fact that the Indian service of the federal government had fallen into a sorry state. 1
Fortunately, a strong movement for reform followed the
expose, and congress', through the appropriation act of April,
1869, authorized the president to organize a board of Indian
commissioners, who were to "exercise joint control with the
secretary of the interior over the disbursement of the
appropriations made by the act."2
This provision represents both an expression of the
lack of confidence in the Office of Indian Affairs and a determination to correct some of the abuses charged against it.
The board, first organized in June, 1869, had its powers
sharply increased and modified from time to' time. Among
its more important duties during the first few years of its
existence were the supervision of' the purchase and transportation of annuity goods, and the audit of the accounts
of the Office of Indian Affairs. Members of the commission also visited the different tribes and counseled with the
chiefs and agents; they frequently escorted parties of Indians
to the cities of the North and the East; investigated, reported, and publicized the cruelties committed by white persons against the tribesmen; recommended needed changes
and improvements in the service; and championed Indian
rights throughout the nation. They served gratuitously, and
appear to have been men "eminent for their intelligence and
philanthropy," as the act required. The commission became
1. Laurence F. Schmeckebier, The Office of Indian Affairs, its History, Activities
and Organization: in Institute for Government Research, Service Monographs of the
United States Government, no. 48 (Baltimore, 1927), p. 47; Frederic L. Pa.xson, The
Last American Frontier (New York, 1910), chap. xvii. The report itself is printed
in 40 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D., no. 97.
2. Laws of the United States Relating to Indian Affairs (Washington, 1884),
pp. 31-32.
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at once a dominant force in determining the Indian policy
of the government.3
Along with the establishment of the board of Indian
commissioners came another important change in the administration of Indian affairs. This was President Grant's peace
policy or "Quaker Policy." Soon after his election, Grant
had a conference with an executive committee representing
the Orthodox Friends in the United States. The committee
suggested that the president appoint religious men as Indian agents and employees, believing that such persons
would have a more wholesome in'fluence over the savages
than that exercised by the grafters and spoilsmen under the
prevailing system. The president perhaps thought he saw
in the proposal a partial solution for the vexing Indian problem, or possibly he felt that here was a means for shifting
the responsibility, should failure result. In any case, he
accepted the plan and promptly adopted a new policy relative to the appointment of Indian agents by delegating their
nominations to the several religious organizations interested in Indian mission work. 4
Considerable delay was to elapse before the plan could
be instituted among the Apaches, for no official agreements
had been made with them; neither had they been assigned
to any definite reservations. However, the board of Indian
commissioners was ready to lay the necessary groundwork.
Shortly after the organization of the board, Vincent Colyer,
its secretary, while inspecting the Navaho agency near Fort
Defiance, New Mexico, met a deputation of visiting Apache
chiefs. He ascertained that they were anxious for a general
peace council, and in his subsequent report to the board
stated that a part of the wild Apaches were gathered near
Canada Alamosa, where they sought both aid and a reservation. 5 Due t? his effort~, a small amount of subsistence was
furnished the Southern Apaches during 1870, and the re3.
40
5.

Richardson, The Commanche Barrier, ·Po 324.
Ibid., ppo 324-325; Richardson, Messages and Papers, vol. vii, p. 109.
R. B. I. C.. , 1869, p. 55.
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suIts, according to the field reports, were encouraging enough
to instill a feeling among the members of the board that
far-reaching efforts should be made to bring about peace
with all the Apaches. 6
The board's desire for peace was also heightened by
various other significant factors. In the East there was a
growing conviction that war as a method of Indian control
was futile, and that a pacific policy should be tried. The
enormous costs of the wars, the paucity of results attained
and the outrages of the whites against the Indians were
harped upon until the most bitter prejudice was aroused
against the people of the Southwest. Even Territorial Delegate McCormick felt himself constrained to declare in congress that the "war policy" had failed and that the peace
policy must be tried. 7
The sudden development of a keen interest in the mining
possibilities of the Apache country also worked mightily for
a trial of the peace plan. Until 1869, the federal officials
stationed in the Apache range had shaped their reports to
their own selfish ends; consequently, the section was commonly represented as a barren and worthless land with
limited mineral resources. But . this view was. quickly
changed by the publication of J. Ross Browne's, Report on
The Mineral Resources of the States and Territories West
of the Rocky Mountains, and by Governor Safford's vivid
elucidation, during the winter of 1869-1870, of the fact that
a solution of the Apache menace loomed as a prerequisite to
mineral exploitation. Immediately, powerful capitalists and
mining groups interested themselves in a solution of the
Apache troubles, and generally they accepted the views of
the advocates of peace. s
Thus, with strong forces working in their favor, the
Cf. supra, pp. 37-38.
Weekly Arizonian, Feb. 28, 1869; Arizona Citizen, June 24, July 29, 1871;
Bancroft, Arizona and New Mexico, p. 559; 42 Cong., 2 sess., Congo Globe, vol. cvii,
appendix, p. 397.
8. Weekly Arizonia.n, June 19, 1869, Feb. 5, 1870; C. A. Luke to Grant, April 8,
1871, I. 0., P 425. Browne's report is printed in 40 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D. no. 202,
vol. xvi.
6.

7.

FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES

43

board of Indian commissioners persisted in their aim for a
peaceful solution of the Apache troubles, and they quickly
gained considerable support from high officials;9 Early in
March, 1871, the officiaJs of the department of the interior,
strongly supported by President Grant, authorized Superintendent Nathaniel Pope of New Mexico to send Cochise and
, a select party of Apaches to Washington for a peace conference. But the attempt failed, because of the chief's
ingrained distrust of the military and the citizens, and his
lack of confidence in the intentions of the government. 10
This 'failure made the board more determined than
ever to strike directly at the Apache problem. Accordingly,
congress was induced to appropriate seventy thousand dollars "to collect the Apache Indians of Arizona and New Mexico upon reservations . . . and to promote peace and civilization among them."ll The commissioners now directed
Colyer, in his capacity as special commissioner, to visit the
Apache country to avert an expected outbreak of hostilities,
and late in May the department of the interior decided that
he should be specifically instructed to cooperate with the
military in its attempt to locate the Apaches upon the White
Mountain reservation; moreover, they agreed to allow him
one-half of the recent appropriation to effect the task. To
insure "harmonious cooperation" the war department
directed the military in Arizona to afford the special commissioner "every facility in their power for the accomplishment of the object."12
Colyer,. evidently with a more elaborate program in
mind than had been planned, had a conference with President Grant at Long Branch, New Jersey, on July 13, 1871,
which resulted in a considerable enlargement of his powers.
9. Colyer to the President, Jan 7, 1871, R. B. I. C., 1879, pp. 109-110; Gov. Wm.
A. Pile to Hamilton Fish, June 19, 1871, A. G. 0., 2470. See also Delano's annual
repo>t for 1871 in 42 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D. no. I, vol. iii, P. 10.
10. E. S. Parker to Delano, July 21, 1871, R. B. I. C., 1871, p. 68.
11. R., B. I. C., 1871, pp. 5, 35.
12. Parker to Delano, May 29, 1871, I. D.; Delano to Felix R. Burnot, May 29,
1871. I. D., L. B. no. 10; Belknap to Delano, May 31,' 1871, I. D.
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In fact, the president directed Secretary of War W. W.
Belknap to give full support to "any arrangement" that Colyer might make with the Apache bands. 13
The special commissioner proc;eeded at once to Santa
Fe, where he learned that the irate citizens near Canada
Alamosa had formally organized with the intention of exterminating all the Indians collected at the Southern Apache
agency. Fearful of a calamity that would frustrate all hopes
for peace, he hurried on with Superintendent Pope to Canada
Alamosa, and here met the spectacle of an agency without
Indians. Intelligence soon revealed that the 1,200 Indians
recently gathered there had stampeded to the mountains to
avoid the threatened massacre. Colyer now tried to arrange
a general council, but the chiefs refused to leave their hiding
places. Thus frustrated by a "few lawless white men" who
were "allowed to overturn all the good work of the government," he decided to in~pect regions more remote from
the settlements, with a view' of establishing a reservation. 14
The Colyer party, strongly escorted and fully provisioned, enter.ed the isolated Apache country of western New
Mexico and eastern Arizona at Ojo Caliente. Proceeding to
the Tulerosa valley, the special commissioner was delighted
to find that the area was ideally suited for a reservation, and
he reported that it was "remote from white settlements, surrounded by mountains not easily crossed, sufficient arable
land, good water, and plenty of wood and game." Without
delay, he declared the region beginning at the headwaters
of the Tularosa River "and extending down the same ten
miles on each side for a distance of thirty miles, to be an
Indian reservation for the sole use and occupation of the
Southern and other roving bands of Apache In.dians ..."
13. Grant to Delano, July 13, 1871, R. B. I. C., 1871, p. 68; Grant to Belknap,
July 14, 1871, A. G. 0., 2618.
The president's interest caused the department of the interior to invest Colyer
with power to take any action needed "for locating the nomadic tribes of those
territories upon suitable reservations." Acting Secretary to Colyer, July 21, 1871,
R. B. I. C., 1871, p. 68.
14. All correspondence in the case is printed in R. B. I. C., 1871, pp. 69-72. See
also Colyer's letter of Aug. 22, 1871, in ibid., p. 38.
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At the same time he ordered Superintendent Pope to have
the Indians that were collected at Canada Alamosa removed
to the new reserve at onceY
. Unsuccessful in solving the Apache troubles in New
Mexico, but certain that the groundwork for an eventual
peace had been arranged, Colyer reached Camp Apache on
September 2. Colonel John Green, in .command, wasenthusiastic about the peace plan and reported that the Indians
in the immediate vicinity of the post were ready for its inception. The Indians themselves, especially Chief Miguel,
welcomed Colyer, and well might they, for a consignment of
$2,000 worth of beef, corn and clothing that he had ordered
for them when he first reached the Indian country had just
arrived. 16 In a few days, nearly four hundred Indians were
at hand, all making the most effusive professions of peace.
Colyer lost no time in designating a vast area about Camp
Apache as an Indian reservation,17 and the next day, September 7, he held a general peace council. Colonel Green as
spokesman explained to the assembled chiefs the advantages
to be derived from peace ona reservation, where rations and
supplies would be furnished free, and where the bands
would be safe from molestation. But he made it clear that all
who stayed away would be pursued and killed. The chiefs,
after insisting upon the immediate delivery of provisions
and requesting ;that their beef be delivered on hoof so that
they could get the hides and tallow, agreed to comply with
the government's demands.. A systematic distribution of
Indian goods followed, and then Colyer, convinced that the
peace plan was successfully inaugurated among the Coyoteros, prepared to leave for Camp Grant. 1S
15. Colyer to Delano, Sept. 6, 1871, I. 0., C 631; Executive Orders Relating to
Indian Reservations, p. 128; Colyer to Pope, Aug. 29, 1871, A. C. 0., 3441.
16. 41 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D. no. I, vol. iii, p. 543; R. B. I. C., 1871, pp. 40, 72.
73, 77.
17. Colyer to Delano, Sept. 6, 1871, op. cit.; Colyer to Green, Sept. 5, 1871, 1. 0.,
631. For a detailed description of the reservation, see Executive O;'ders Relating to
Indian Reservations, p. 7.
18. Colyer to Delano, Sept. 18, 1871, 1. 0., C. __ 37.. Five days after the council
one Coyotero band was charged with the theft of fifteen horses from near the post,
Arizona Citizen, Oct. 7, 1871.
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The Colyer party in its journey to Camp Grant penetrated directly through the heart of the Apache country.
Wherever Indians were found the special commissioner was
met with the greatest manifestations of goodwill, but the
frontiersmen looked upon him with intense displeasure. 19 In
fact, Governor Safford had taken the unprecedented action
of issuing a proclamation calling upon the citizens to receive
the federal commissioner with "kindness and hospitality."2o
But Colyer had eagerly anticipated success at Camp Grant,
and on his way west, at Lawrence, Kansas, had selected the
post "as a reservation on the west, where the Apache Indians
are to be protected and fed.:' He had also arranged for
Lieutenant Whitman to be left in charge, and at his request
the military had sent runners to bring in the peacefully disposed bands.21
No time was lost in· arranging a council. Chiefs Eskiminzin and Chiquito were present with all their followers
who had survived the massacre in the spring, and it was
obvious that their desire for peace and safety would result in
the easy collection of several hundred other tribesmen, once
they were assured that the government was sincere in its
promises. Colyer, now quite aware that a reserve at Camp
Grant was doomed to be a temporary one due to the prox19. Colyer was shamefully abused hy the frontier press during the summer, and
he erred by not giving proper attention to- the citizen's side of the question. His life
was 'even threatened on, one occasion. News reached the East that parties involved in
the Camp Gr'ant massacre intended to assassinate him to prevent the delivery of a
report to the president. Peter Cooper then asked Grant to render the special commissioner proper. protection, and Secretary Belknap actually issued a public statement to
reassure the proponents of peace. Cooper to the President, Sept. 19, 1871, A. G. 0.,
3299 ; Belknap to Cooper, Sept. 21, 1871', ibid.
20. Colyer to Delano, Sept. 18, 1871, op. cit. The proclamation may he found in
Arizona Citizen, Aug. 26, 1871, or in R. B. I. C., 1871, pp. 79-80.
21. Colyer to Delano, Sept. 18, 1871, op. cit.; A. G. to Crook, Aug. 2, 1871,
I. 0., A 344. Just at the time Colyer reached Camp Grant, a party of nearly
two hundred armed whites were only twelve miles from the reserve. The post officers
saw that the Indians feared another massacre, and to prevent a general stampede,
ordered the party not to approach nearer than ten miles to the post. Since this action
practically closed travel between Tucson and Florence, Crook censured the commandant,
declaring that such orders would uunnecessarily provoke the hostilities of the citizens
toward the military and the Indians." Crook to Capt. Wm. Nelson, Sept. 22, 1871,
R. B. I. C., 1871,
82.

P.
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imity of a dangerous white population, attempted to induce
the Indians to remove to the Camp Apache region. But the
Indians rejected the plan, and the special commissioner, "believing it better for the sake of peace," designated a considerable area contiguous 'to the post as a reservation for all
peacefully inclined Arivaipa, Pinal and other roving bands
of Apache Indians. He made it clear to the chiefs that their
followers would suffer dire punishment if they strayed
beyond the reserve limits. On the part of the government he
agreed that, besides furnishing them subsistence, an attempt
would be made to restore the children carried away at the
time of the massacre. 22
The peace party then hurried on to Camp Verde 23 to
examine conditions in the eastern Yavapai country. Since
the Indians of this particular region were quite impoverished and exhausted, Colyer, with the aid of the post officers,
had little difficulty in collecting them for a conference. On
October 2, 1871, when the council began, the general wretchedness of the tribesmen was vividly apparent. The chief
was so weak and sick from hunger that stimulants and food
were required before he could command strength enough
to participate in the talk. No less enervated were the mass
of his followers. Danger from the whites, ineffective arms
for the chase, and a general scarcity of game were responsible for the depiorable state to which the bands had fallen.
Already the old men had resigned themselves to their fate.
Despite their condition, the Indians resisted his suggestion
of a reserve at Date Creek, but agreed that they would wel-·
come the establishment of one somewhere along the Verde
River. Accordingly, after the post officers had indicated
22. Colyer to Delano, Sept. 18, 1871, op cit.; Executive Orders Relating to Indian
. Res'ervations, p. 3.
23. En route, at Fort McDowell, Colyer's efforts· to parley with the Tontos met
with failure. The unwillingness of the Tontos to talk peace was doubtless due to
the fact that they had come to view all peaceful overtures of the whites as perfidious.
Nevertheless. the commissioner made the post reservation a temporary Indian reservation and feeding station. He allotted the commandant $400 to buy clothing for those
tribesmen who might come to the fort later in the year. ·Colyer to Delano, Sept. 24,
1871, 1. 0.,· C 562; Colyer to Col. N. A. Dudley, Sept. 25. 1871, ibid.
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their preference for a Verde location, the commissioner
,acquiesced, by ordering that the Indians should be protected
and fed on a reserve to be twenty miles wide and to extend
upstream from the post area for forty-five miles. 24
Colyer now visited Fort Whipple for a discussion of the
Apache problem with General Crook.25 Sharp differences
were quickly uncovered and naturally so, for Colyer had
already written Delano that Crook's retention as department
commander "jeopardizes the success of the President's Indian policy here." Nevertheless, he accepted the commander's advice not to move the Yavapai of western Arizona to
the new Verde Reservation during the approaching winter,
but rather, to establish a temporary reserve for those Indians who loitered about the military post of Camp Date
Creek,26 Although the two men conferred in,the most cordial manner, Colyer had scarcely left Fort Whipple for San'
Francisco before Crook wrote General Schofield an unusual
personal letter that eventually reached the adjutant general. This communication shows that Crook, who believed
he was "to be allowed the entire settlement of the Apache
question," felt that Colyer considered himself as "the representative of the President in carrying out his (the President's) 'Pet Theory' with the Indians." Crook further
shows that the peace policy "managers" were merely using
, Colyer as an "instrument" to make it appear that a lasting
peace could be made with the "much abused and injured
Apache" were it not for the opposition of the military; and
that they were really anxious for him (Crook) to wage war
so that he "would be abused as the great North American
Butcher." In order to offset the designs of the "Policy Men,"
the general proposed to remain nominally inactive as long as
Colyer was "sitting on and controlling the valves." Colyer's
24, Colyer to Delano. Oct. 3, 1871. R. B. I. C., 1871, pp. 56-57; Ezecutive Order
Files, 1. 0., I 971.
25. Cf. infra, note 27.
26. Colyer to Delano, Oct. 6. 1871, R. B. I. C., 1871. p. 57; same to same, Sept. 17,
1871, 1. D.
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peace .with the Apaches he characterized as a "humbug"
which would soon come to naught. 27
Meanwhile, Colyer reached San Francisco, conferred
with General Schofield, and. then entrained for the East.
Few details concerning their talk are known, although the
general indicated that he was pleased that Crook had been
left with the entire s.upervision of those Indians who might
choose to stay on the new reservations. However, the special
commissioner was not reassured, and by wire requested
Delano personally to see that Belknap issued no orders "looking to war" until a report could be made. 28
Colyer reached Washington on October 27, only to find
that Delano was absent from the city. Fearing that the
"contractors, politicians and Indian exterminators" might
gain the president's ear, he rushed to the White House,
where he met Secretary Belknap who had just arrived for
a cabinet meeting. Belknap, somewhat·. angered, said that
Colyer was "interfering," and indicated that he "only
awaited the President's word" to strengthen General Crook.
But the special commissioner was not to be frustrated, and
through a message to the president· received the assurance
that he would be received immediately upon Delano's return.
During the next few days he arranged "that such pressure
would be brought on the President as to stop an aggressive
war."29
President Grant took up the Apache problem with
Delano, Belknap and Colyer on November 6. After a long
and careful discussion, a general line of policy was evolved,
which Delano was directed to prepare more fully in the form
of specific recommendations. This fundamental program
completed within a few hours, stipulated that (1) the presi27. Crook to Schofield, Oct. 10, 1871, A. G. 0., 3920. In this letter Crook states
that part of his information resulted from talks that Mrs. Crook had recently had at
Washington with Secretary Delano.
28. Colyer to Delano, Oct. 19, 1871, I. D.
Schofield notified Sherman that "the President ought to know how very differently his military and civil representatives in Arizona view the Apache question."
Schofield to Sherman, Oct. 23. 1871, A. G. 0., 3920.
29. Colyer to Delano, Oct. 30, 1871, 1. D.
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dent was to designate as reservations the areas selected by
Colyer; (2) the roving bands were to be required to locate
upon the reservations, where they were to receive subsistence and protection as long as they remained friendly "with
the Government, each other, and the white people"; (3) the
braves as well as the noncombatants were to stay within
the reserve limits; (4) the whites were to be warned that the
government would protect the peaceable Indians to the full
extent of its power; (5) the superintendent of Indian affairs
was to locate at Fort Whipple; and (6) the war department
was to select "suitable and discreet" army officers to act as
Indian agents until superseded by civil agents. so
The execution of. the program devolved upon General
Sherman, and without delay he ordered the division commanders of the Division of the Pacific and the Missouri, to
comply with Secretary Delano's recommendations. Sarcastically, he pointed out that since the Office of Indian Affairs
was rarely able to provide food, the commissary department
would be required to meet the implied condition that those
Indians "acting in good faith should not be permitted to
starve." The general also stated that after a reasonable time
General Crook was to feel assured that "whatever measures
of severity" he might· adopt to bring peace would "be
approved by the War Department and the President. s1
Crook, In fact, had been quite active during the summer of 1871 despite the government's peace efforts. He
arrived unannounced in Tucson, on June 19, fifteen days
after having assumed command, and within one hour was
working on, his plans and preparing instructions. By sundown every officer in southern Arizona had been ordered to
report to him. .He then spent the next few days in consultation with every individual he could find who had any significant information that would be of value in planning a
SO. Colyer to
President, Nov. 7,
31. Sherman
L. B. vol. !iv, p.
Crook.

Delano, Dec. 20, t871, R. B. I. C., 1871, pp. 59, 73; Delano to the
1871, 1. D., L. B. vol. x, pp. 326-327.
to Schofield, Nov. 9, 1871, A. G. 0., Headquarters of the Army
413. A letter to Sheridan was identical, except the reference to
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campaign against the savages. Yet the general had no intention of an immediate offensive. Rather, he looked forward to a thoroughly planned war that would bring a final
and complete success. 32
.
Action would doubtless have been deferred for an extended time, had not a sudden increase in killings and attacks in the Chiricahua country required a demonstration
against Cochise. Therefore, with the joint purpose of leading a training expedition into the field and of striking the
chief a decisive blow, Crook collected around himself some
of the most able and ambitious young officers in Arizona,
organized a command of six companies of cavalry and scouts,
and moved out for Fort Bowie on July 11. No Indians were
encountered en route, but sufficient evidence of their numbers was noted to convince the general that a permanent
peace would be impossible until the Chiricahuas were subjugated.33 News concerning Colyer's peace'mission now
ended the plan to run Cochise down, and instead, Crook
decided to move his expedition farther north, where he hoped
not only to meet some hostile parties, but also to form an
alliance with the friendly Indians near Camp Apache. 34
The command upon its arrival at Camp Apache on
August 12, was gratified to find some five hundred Indians
under Chiefs Miguel, Chiquito and Pedro, hard at work cultivating corn, which fact Crook enthusiastically reported as
"really the entering wedge in the solution of the Apache
32. 49 Cong., 1 sess., H. R. no. 531, p. 3; Arizona Citizen, June 24, 1871; Bourke,
On the Border with Crook, p. 108; Crook to A. G., Sept. 28, 1871, 42 Cong., 2 sess.,
H. E. D. no. I, vol. ii, pp. 77-78. Crook's basic plans included: (1) supplies to be
brought from California by water rather than by land; (2) wagons and saddles
especially made to withstand heat and hard usage to be furnished; (3) telegraph
lines to be built into department; and (4) pack mules to be made more serviceable
by giving them extraordinarily particular care.
33. Crook to Townsend, July 10, 1871, I. 0., A 501; Arizona Citizen, Sept. 9,
1871.
34. 42 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D. no. I, vol. ii, p. 78.
Shortly after Crook left Fort Bowie, the beef herd was attacked within a stone's
throw of the parade ground. The Indians killed twa men and made away with thirtyeight animals. About the same time a body of troops bound for the post engaged four
. hundred savages near the' San Pedro and killed thirteen. The military suffered a loss
of four. Arizona Citizen, July 22, 29, 1871.
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Question."35 The Indians acquiesced to the general's view
that white pressure necessitated a life of peace, and he easily
enlisted a group of scouts to help him ferret out the incorrigibles. He also persuaded all the friendly Indians to enroll
their names at the post, where each of them was furnished
a writ.ten, personal description as a guarantee ~gainst violence by the whites. 36 But some of the less docile Coyoteros had gone on the warpath as a protest to the Camp
Grant Massacre, and these the general now hoped to strike
on his way to the department headquarters at Fort
Whipple. 37
The resulting reconnaissance westward to Camp Verde
accomplished little at the moment, although by the time the
post was reached the commander had formulated far-reaching plans for "concentrating on one band ... at a time until
they would submit to peace at any terms." Since orders had
just come to suspend all aggressive operations until Colyer's
mission was completed, the general pushed on to Fort Whipple "to await further developments."38
Colyer, as previously noted, ended his peace tour within a: short time and hastened back to Washington to win the
approval of his superiors. 39 But despite the fact that considerable improvement did follow among the Coyotero, Pinal,
Arivaipa and Verde bands,40 events in the Indian country
soon proved that the Apache troubles were far from settled.
On the morning of November 5, 1871, a California stage
loaded with eight passengers was attacked near Wickenhurg
35. Crook to Townsend, Sept: I, 1871, I. 0., A 570.
36.
37.

Ibid.
Ibid; Arizona Citizen, Sept.
Crook to Townsend, Sept. I,
I. 0., A
39. Cf. supra, p.
Amy to Colyer, Oct. 11,
Carr. Bd. Ind. Cams., pp.
Whitman to
Colyer, Oct.
I. D.: David White to Colyer, Nov.
R. B. I. C., 1871,

38.

40.

p.

57.

49.

20, 1871,

16, 1871.
1871,

1871,

570.

22, 1871,

3-6;

Twelve hundred Southern Apaches were located on Colyer's Tulerosa Reserve,
where they continued to depredate, but less so than formerly. Gen. Gordon Granger
to A. A. G., Sept.
A. G. 0.,
Colonel 1... H. Davis, who inspected the
agency for General Pope, decided that the new site would offer no barrier to further depredating. For this reason he counseled that the "experiment" of 'peace be
tried at Canada Alamosa. Davis to A. A. G., Oct.
A. G. 0.,

20, 1871,

3863.

25, 1871,

4047.
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by a raiding party of Apache Mohaves, said to belong to
the main group of nearly one thousand tribesmen who were
fed at Date Creek. This attack was made especially significant by the fact that of the six persons killed,41 three were
members of the Wheeler Expedition,42 one of whom was
Frederick W. Loring of Massachusetts, a young writer of
great promise, widely known' in the East. 43 The eastern
press gave,wide publicity to the killing of Loring, and many
prominent pacific-minded individuals now became convinced
that Apache affairs had been described inaccurately, "by
those who have allowed their philanthropy to outrun their
judgment and sense of justice."44
Public opinion was further influenced against the peace
efforts by a notorious and rabid western press which assailed
Colyer and the peace advocates with a deluge of journalistic execration. The pages of the Alta California and the San
Francisco Times, throughout the last half of 1871, were
filled with bitter communications from officials' and visitors
in the Apache country, and many of these tirades were reprinted in the eastern papers. Even the federal grand jury
at Tucson resorted to similar methods of propaganda, for
its report in October, largely an investigation of Indian matters, was essentially a castigation of the peace policy as inaugurated by Colyer. 45
The situation soon played' into the hands of the war
party, and upon the receipt of General Sherman's instructions,46 the military again prepared to pursue a rigorous
policy. The adjutant general suggested to Schofield that the
reserves· selected by Colyer might be abandoned, but Scho41. For details of the massacre see, Capt. Chas. Meinholt to Lt. F. H. Ebstein,
Nov. 9, 1871, A. G. 0., 4546; Wm. Krueger to W. G. Peckham, Dec. 9, 1871, in Grand
Army Journal, Jan. 6, 1872.
42. Wheeler's epochal surveys are covered in George M. Wheeler, Report Upon
Geographic Surveys West of the 100th Meridian, in charge of First Lieutenant George
M. Wheeler (Wash., '1875-1889), 8 vols.
While at Harvard, Loring had drawn the attention of James Russell Lowell.
S'ee Dictionary of American Biography (New York, 1928-36), vol. xi, p. 417.
44. McCormick to Salford, Nov. '16, 1871, in Arizona Citizen, Dec. 23, 1871.
45. The complete report is given in Arizona Citizen, Oct. 28, 1871.
46. Cf. supra, p. 50.

43.
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field apparently ignored the proposal by replying that until
the experiment of peace was tried "it would be wise not to
appoint any civilian agents for the Apaches but to leave
them under exclusive military control," because "strict
military control of the Indians on the reservations is necessary to effect the desired changes in their habits."47 Then
using Sherman's instructions as a point d'appui, Schofield
made out general orders for Crook's guidance, which later
proved to be epochal in nature. These orders completely
shattered the outworn policy of expediency and set forth the
following instructions "for the government of Indians subject to military control in the Territory of Arizona:" (1) all
roving bands were to go upon the reservations at once; (2)
if found away, they were to be punished as hostiles; (3) an
army officer was to act as agent on each reservation; (4) a
descriptive list was to be made of each male old enough to
go upon the warpath, with the number in his family recorded, and a duplicate form was to be on his person at all
times; (5) the presence on the reservation of every male
was to be verified at least once each day; (6) a tribe, unless
guilty of giving aid, was not to be punished for the acts of
indiyiduals; (7) the families of absent warriors were tOe be
held in ~_ustody until captures were effected; (8) the department commander was to fix a time-limit for the inauguration of the new regime; (9) no whites except officials were
to be allowed on the reserves without permission, and official
escorts were to be furnished in all cases; (10) each Indian
was to receive a specific amount of rations, and the issues
were to be supervised by, army officers; (11) vigorous operations were to be continued against the hostiles until they
submitted; (12) incorrigibles were to be hunted down with
the aid of friendly scouts; and (13) full authority was conferred upon the department commander "to adopt such
measures" as might be needed "to give full effect to the policy of the government."48
47. Townsend to Schofield, Nov. 11, 1871, A. G. 0., 3896; Schofield to Townsend, Nov. 21, 1871, ibid., 4156.
48. Gen. Orders no. 10, Nov. 21, 1871, Ibid., 4553. General Sheridan issued
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At Washington, the official attitude fully indicated that
temporizing was ended.. That Colyer had lost the support of
Grant, Sherman, Delano and Belknap, is shown by their
action in promising that Crook would be "warmly supported in rigorous aggressive operations." Delano even ordered Superintendent of Indian Affairs Herman Bendel!
either to cooperate with Crook in the new plan of pacification, or to resign at once. 49
. Arrangements were also made for a general movement
of new troops to the Apache country and congress was asked
for $50,000 to build a military telegraph into Arizona. 5o
But the peace advocates were not to be worsted without a
struggle. In fact, after the Loring massacre, "certain interests" continued to harp upon the matter until they led a
large portion of the eastern public to believe that a party of
frontiersmen had committed the crime to insure a continuance of the war. Some of the military also supported the
peace group, by declaring that the Indians could never be
reclaimed by "following two directly opposite policies at
the· same time-one of war, the other of peace." And the
civilian friends of the tribesmen insisted "that there is no
chance to get up a war with the Apaches as all are on the
Reservation and at Peace." President Felix Brunot of the
board of Indian commissioners boldly wrote that a policy of
"judicious forbearance" should be substituted for General
Schofield's stringent orders which, if continued, were certain to defeat the peaceful designs of the· government. AIwa.ys lukewarm towards a policy of force, the officials of the
department of the interior became positively opposed when
they realized that a consummation of the war plans might
49. McCormick to Safford, Nov. 16, 1871, in Arizona Citizen, Dec. 23, 1871;
Delano to Comm., Nov. 8, 1871, 1. 0., I 971.
Herman BendelJ of Albany, New York, was appointed superintendent early in
1871. He took charge in late March. BendelJ to Parker, April 10, 1871, I, 0., Superintendent's Letter Book (hereafter cited as S. L. B.), vol. i, p. 9.
50. 42 Cong., 2 sess., S. E. D., no. 14.
almost identical orders to regulate the control of the Western Apaches in New
Mexico. All band~, including those that might "come into New Mexico," were to be
concentrated at the Tulerosa Reservation. Gen. Orders no. 8, Nov. 20, 1871, ibid., 2465.
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result in an intrenchment of'military control. 51 But of the
greatest weight to the peace party were the views soon to be
expressed by the president:
I do not believe our creator ever placed different races of men on this earth with the view of having the stronger exert all thei:r energies on exterminating the weaker. If any change takes place in
the Indian policy of the government while I hold
my present office it will be on the humanitarian
side of the question. 52
The war party, meantime, ·had gone ahead with their
plans for a drastic policy, and Crook in December 1871 sent
word to the bands that they must be on the reservations by
February 15, 1872, if they wished to avoid severe punishment. In compliance hundreds of Indians rushed to the
reserves where, according to reports, they not only avoided
the rigors of winter and the pangs of hunger, but also prepared for hostilities by caching their surplus rations and
increasing their store of munitions. 53 Crook waited patiently
until February 7, and then announced that after the elapse
of nine days no Apache absent from a reserve would be
received except as a prisoner of war. And Schofield, in close
touch with affairs, wired the war department two days
before the deadline that "late" advices from Crook indicated the necessity of an immediate "unavoidable campaign."54
.
War was now at hand on the frontier, but peace had
again triumphed in Washington. In fact, Crook had scarcely
51. Prescott Miner, Sept. 14, 1872; Col. N. M. Dudley to Colyer, Nov. 2, 1871,
R. B. 1. C., 1871, p. 53; C. E. Coa"ley to Colyer, Jan. 30, 1872, 1. 0., C 870; 'Brunot to
Delano, Jan. 27, 1872, A. G. 0., 508; Delano to Francis A. Walker, Jan. 2, 1872, 1. 0.,
(n. f.).

52. Grant to Geo. H. Stuart, Oct. 26, 1872, 1. 0., Scrap Book, B. I. C. In general,
President Grant probably favored a mild policy in Indian relations. The pressure of
strong pro-war economic and political groups was doubtless the cause of his inconsistent views.
53. Gen. Orders no. 32, Dec. 11, 1871, and Gen. Orders no. 35, Dec. 27, 1871, A.
G. 0., 3896; Arizona Citizen, Jan. 27, 1872; Bende]] to Walker, Jan. 30, 1872, 1. 0.,
S. L. 8., vol. i, p. 228.
54. Gen. Orders no. 9, Feb. 7, 1872, in Arizona Citizen, Feb. 24, 1872; Schofield
to A. G., Feb. 13, 1872, 1. 0., W 1271.

FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES

57

moved his commands into the field before the war department, at the· request of Delano, notified Schofield to avoid
hostilities as much as possible. 55 Telegrams of protest
recounting recent outrages 56 accomplished nothing, for the
president, Secretary Delano and Secretary Belknap had conferred again and decided that instead of war, "the Apaches
should be induced by persuasive means, if possible, to return
to their reservations, or better, to go upon some reservation
in New Mexico." But of greater chagrin to the war party
was the intelligence that a new agent of the interior department would soon visit the Indian country "to cooperate with
the military" in preserving peace. 57
The president and Secretary Delano wished to make no
mistake this time, and after much pondering over the choice
of an agent, selected General O. O. Howard, an official of
proved experience in the field of Indian .diplomacy. Delano
instructed him to proceed at once to the Indian country,
where he was to take steps which in his own judgment'
seemed best adapted "to maintain peace and secure the execution of the policy of the government." Fully admonished
to confer and cooperate with the military, the general was·
also directed to persuade as many chiefs "as possible" to'
return with him toWashing1mi for a peace conference. 58
Howard, thus armed with plenary power, hastened west
and entered the Apache country at Fort McDowell. From
55. A. G. to Schofield, Feb. 20, 1872, A. G. 0., 549. Sheridan was similarly instructed.
56. The post herd was stolen at Fort McDowell; eight hundred Indians left Date
Creek, killed two men, attacked two trains and invested the Prescott-Wickenburg
country; and a like number left Camp Verde, although all the women and 'children
remained at the reserve. The bucks then harrassed every mine and ranch in the
region. Crook to A. A. G., Feb. 20, 1872, ibid., 3057; Capt. C. C. C. Carr to A. A. G.,
Feb. 22, 1872, ibid., 1210. See especially Schofield to Townsend, Feb. 26, 1872, ibid., 508.
57. Townsend to Schofield, Feb. 24, 1872, A. G. 0., 2659.
58. Delano to Belknap, Feb. 29, 1872, ibid., 717; Delano to Howard, Feb. 29,
1872, 42 Cong., 3 sess., H. E. D. 1W. 1, vol. 1, pp. 155-159. See o;lso, Special Orders,
no. 53, Mar. 2, 1872, I. D.
Grant showed his personal interest in Howard's mission, by writing Schofield a
letter of placation. Grant to Schofield, Mar. 6, 1872, 42 Cong., 3 sess., H. E. D. ;'0. 1,
vol. i, p. 160: On March 5 the house of representatives had a heated discussion of the
Apache problem. The administration's views were clearly presented. See Congo Globe,
. .
vol. cHi, .pp. 1433-1434.
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this point, after a most harmonious conference with General Crook, he pushed on to Fort Grant only to find upon his
arrival that the one thousand Indians under the care of
Major E. W. Crittenden were ready to flee at a moment's
notice. 59 The new civilian agent,· Edward C. Jacobs, had
just arrived,60 but Howard "deemed the presence of Lieutenant Whitman essential to assist in restoring a change of
confidence with them," and had him temporarily returned
from his point of incarceration at Camp Crittenden. 61 In
a constructive council on April 26, 1872, the Indians not only
demanded the return of their stolen children, but also insisted that Whitman be restored as their agent. More important to future relations, the chiefs suggested that they be
given a new reservation, far removed from the whites, in
some healthier locality. Howard considered their proposal
of extreme importance, and upon leaving for Tucson, promised that he would arrange for the holding of a general conference of Indians; citizens and territorial officials at the
post on May 21. 62
'
The general tarried in Tucson only long enough to
.arrange with Safford for the return of the captive children
held in the town; then he turned north to the Prescott are~.
En route, at Date Creek, he recommended that the nine
hundred poverty stricken savages living near the post be
moved to the Colorado River Reservation as soon as their
crops wereharvested. 63 lJnfortunately, a sharp increase in
59. Howard to Schofield, April 18, 1872, I. 0., A 1352.
60. Jacobs was a nominee of the Dutch Reformed Church, I. O. I 1219.
61. The unrest of the Indians was caused by the recent ~rrest of Agent .Whitman.
The lieutenant, always an object of suspicion to both the citizens and the military,
was arrested and held for court martial on March 12 by order of General Schofield.
He was charged with .not obeying General Orders no. 10. Special Orders no. 17, Mar.
12, 1872, I. 0., W 1463. The Rev. E. P. Smith, who accompanied Howard, reported
that Whitman's downfall was caused by groups who feared his success as agent
would react too favorably for the peace policy. Smith to Walker, April 8, 1872, I. 0.,
S 777. Crook, viewing the matter differently, said one year later: "I told General
Howard that the administration of their affairs under Whitman, Third Cavalry, Was
criminally rotten and neE7ded a thorough investigation but so far from heeding my
suggestion he intensified matters by giving the persons concerned in this rottenness his moral support . . ." .Crook to A. A. G., Ju,ly 3, 1873, A. G. 0., 2933.
62. Howard to Delano, April 27, 1938, I. 0., H 1390.
63. Howard to Delano, May 3, 1872, I. D.; 42 Cong., 3 sess., H. E. D. no. I,
vol. i, p. 154.
7
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depredations by Tontos and Indians of the Verde region
endangered the peace policy; yet Howard without hesitation
notified Crook that "amongst the incorrigible hostile there is
no course left but to deal with vigor, according to your discretion."64
General Howard rested in Prescott for a week, and then
accompanied by General Crook and Superintendent Bendell
crossed over the country to Camp Grant, "arriving on May 20.
Since Governor Safford had already arrived with a large
delegation of officials, citizens and Indian' chiefs, the prearranged conference began'the next morning. After three
days of extended speechmaking-figurative and symbolic
on the part of the Indians and paternalistic and designing on
the part' of the whites-a general peace was made among
the various tribes of southern Arizona, 'in which the Apaches
specifically promised to trail thieves and to help Crook ferret
out those individuals among their bands who' remained
incorrigible. 65
Howard complied with the Apache chiefs' demands for
a healthier location, by designating a large area (to be
known as the San Carlos Reservation) co~tiguous to and
directly south of the White Mountain Reservation as a future
home for all the bands collected at Camp Grant. But in the
case of the retention of Whitman as their agent, he persuaded the chiefs that the lieutenant would be required to
join his regiment. 66 Howard now closed the conference, and
64. Howard to Crook, May 9, 1872, A. G. 0., 2100. Before an execution of Gen, eral Orders no. 9 (cf. supra, p. 56) should occur, Howard suggested that every commandant be informed that peace and civilization were the motives of all action to be
taken. Crook immediately ordered his officers to "aid the duly authorized agents of
the government, by every means in their power, in their efforts to civilize and e]~vate
the Indians under their charge." 42 Cong., 3 ,sess, H. E. D. no. 1, vol. i, p. 171.
65. The governor located and brought six of the captured children to the conference. The other twenty-one (two others had escaped soon after,their capture) Were
reported to be in Mexico. The council almost broke up into a battle when' Howard,
due to the objections of the district attorney, refused to turn the six over. However,
he restored order by agreeing to hold the children at' the agency until the president
could make a decision. Arizona Citize;', 'May 25, 1872. The president restored the
children a few weeks later. McCormick to Bishop J. B. Salp'ointe, July 31, 1872, in
Arizona Citizen, Sept. 7, 1872.
66. 42 Cong., 3 sess., H. E. D. no. I, vol. i, p. 172.
Whitman drOPped out of sight after Schofield, at Howard's request; ordered him
to report at di~ision headquarters. ,Special Orders. no. 29, June 8, 1872, A. G. 0., 2386.
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accompanied by seven prominent Indians who had agreed
to journey with him to the East left the Indian country by
way of Camp Apache, where three Coyotero chiefs were
added to the peace delegation. 67
The delegation reached Washington on June 22, 1872,
and during the next three weeks, in conferences with high
officials and in a public appearance at New York, did much
to strengthen the eastern sentiment for peace. 68 But the
administration decided that its policy among the Apaches
would never be successful unless. Cochise were included;
therefore, President Grant directed Howard to return to the
Apache country on a second mission of peace. 69
Howard reached Camp Apache on August 11, only to
find that the Coyoteros were on the verge of an outbreak.
This situation had developed because of the arrest of sev~
eral chiefs, and also because an impasse had arisen between
the department of the interior and the war department over
the issuance of rations. Diplomatically, the general secured
the release of the prisoners; and by replacing the acting
agent, Major A. J. Dallas, with Dr. Milan Soule, the post
surgeon, he insured a continuance of the issues. 7o
67. ·-Howard's complete report of his mission is printed in 42 Cong., 3 sess.,
H. E. D. no. I, vol. i, pp. 148~158. See also a detailed. report of the Camp Grant
council in Arizona Citizen, May 25, 1872.
68. R. B. I. C., 1872, p. 27.
69. Grant to A. G., July 3, 1872, .A. G. 0., 2663.
During the spring and summer of 1872, conditions in the Cochise country became

fully as serious as they had been in former years. All the depredations were attributed
to the Chiricahuas. Lt. Stephen O'Connor to A. A. G., June 26, 1872; A. G. 0., 3095;
Arizona Citizen, May 4, 11, June I, 15, 29, July 6, 1872.
70. Dallas to editor, Aug. 11, 1872, in Arizona Citizen, Aug. 24, 1872; Howard
to Bendell, Aug. 14, 1872, 1. 0., Howard Correspondence. Hereafter ·this file will be
designated H. C.
On June 25 the war department ordered its officers to stop issues to Indians.
Howard's arrival temporarily solved the problem, and later an exception was made
whereby supplies could be furnished. However, the issuing would have to be done
by non-military men. AU the correspondence is given in A. G. 0., 2061, 2612 and
8985.
Most of the trouble was caused by the delay of the officials of the department of
the interior in approving Bendell's beef contracts, for contractors were reluctant to
make deliveries without approved contracts. But anxious for large profits, they
were willing to deliver the same beef at six cents per pound (one cent extra) in
exchange for certified vouchers. Howard made the concession. Gp. cit. Howard had
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Howard now moved eastward to the Tulerosa Reservation, where he hoped to complete arrangements for a conference with Cochise. But again he was forced to postpone
his main mission in order to prevent a collapse of Colyer's
work in New Mexico.H During his visit of eight days 'Yith
the Southern Apaches, the chiefs advanced every possible
argument against Tulerosa as a reserve, and insisted that
their bands be returned to Canada· Alamosa. They also
pressed for a new agent, by pointing out that their blankets
fell to pieces when damp. The general, of course, refused to
accede to their request, but his promise to submit their questions "to the President for his decision" apparently satisfied
them. However, his action in ordering a liberal increase in
their rations was probably the factor that reconciled them. 72
Still unable to communicate with Cochise, Howard secured the services of Thomas J. Jeffords, an unusual frontiersman,73 who was certain that a peace could be made,
provided the general would go to the chief's stronghold in
the Dragoon Mountains of Arizona. The proposal was
accepted, and the party of three whites and two Indian
friends of the Chiricahuas set out at once. 74
71. Out of 1,600 Southern Apaches reported to be at Canada Alamosa ~n March,
1872, only 450 had removed to Tulerosa by September. O. F. Piper to Pope, Aug. 31,
1872, 42 Cong., 3 sess., H. E. D. no. I, vol. i, p. 306.
72. Howard to Pope, Sept. 5, 1872, H. C.; Howard to Walker, Nov. 7, 1872, I.
0., 383.
73. .r effords was a close friend of Cochise. Dr. Henry S. Turrill, the post surgeon at Fort Bayard in 1872, later wrote that .r effords gained and kept the friendship
of Cochise by selling him ammunition. See The New York Society of the Order of the
Founders and Patriots of America. Publication no. 18 (N. Y., 1907), pp. 16-21. Major
W. R. Price claimed he had witnesses who would testify that .r effords had traded
ammunition to the Indians for stock. Price to A. G., Aug. I, 1873, A. G. 0., 3383.
74. Howard compromised himself at this point, by giving two Southern Apache
bandS permission to go to Canada Alamosa instead of Tulerosa. A rancorous correspondence during the next three months, which involved Sherman, Sheridan, Belknap, Delano
and many other officials, vividly portrays the burning animosities that practically
paralyzed all efforts to solve the Apache problem. The correspondence is collected in
1. 0., W 551.
likely erred on his first trip when he advised Bendell to accept bids which would have
allowed different amounts of issues at the respective reserves. This fact would have
caused unrest among the Indians-hence, the delay in approval. A.G. 0., 2612.
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When the, Stein's Peak region was reached, early in
October, smoke signals were set up, and within a few hours
some sixty of Cochise's followers had made their appearance.
The party was then led over deserts and mountains directly
to the chief's famous retreat. The parley started as soon as
the bands could be assembled. Cochise was so anxious for
peace that he even agreed to move to Canada Alamosa, but
his captains would consent only to a reserve in Arizona.
Howard soon realized that there could be no peace among
the Apaches unless the Chiricahuas were included; therefore, when Cochise emphatically agreed' to restore stolen
property and to guarantee the safety of travellers in his
country, the tribe was promised a reserve of their own selection. But of far greater satisfaction to the bands, was the
announcement that Jeffords was to act as their agent. The
next day, October 13, near Fort Bowie, Howard completed
the final details of the conference, by directing the post commander to furnish the tribe rations until the department of
the interior could assume the responsibility; he then left for
Washington to deliver his report. 75
All the Apaches had now been drawn within the scope
of the peace plan, but affairs at the reserves proved that the
problem of control was yet in its infancy. Liberal subsistence at Camp Grant did not stop the raids; moreover, without a daily muster and with a ration issue every tenth day,
the raiders had ample time to cover a great amount of territory and still be back at the' appointed time. In fact, the
increase in marauding and the development of a storm of
criticism, strongly reminiscent of the situation previous to
the Camp Grant massacre, forced Howard, at the start of
the second trip, to replace Agent Jacobs with George H.
Stevens who was popular with both the frontiersmen and
75. Howard to Crook, Oct. 13, 1872, H. C.; Washington Morning Chronicle,
Nov. '10, 1872; Howard to Maj. S. S. Sumner, Oct. 13, 1872, H. C.; Order setting aside
the Chiricahua reservation, Oct. 11, 1872, 1. 0., H 383. The reserve comprised the
sout,heast corner of Arizona.
At the Pima Villages, Howard learned of unsatisfactory conditions which caused
him to abolish the feeding posts at Fort McDowell and Date Creek. Howard to Crook,
Oct. 13, '1872, H. C.; Howard to Bendell, Oct. 17. 1872, Ariz. Misc.
'
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the Indians. And just after his peace with Cochise, the
general, even more alarmed, ordered that the Camp Grant
bands were to be removed to the San Carios Reservation not
later than January i, 1873. 76 The situation failed to improve
under the new agent, but it was not until December, 1872,
that Crook was able to bring about the requirement' of a
daily muster. At the end of the year, Stevens reported affairs
to be in a"hubbub." 'To Bendell's view, however, the trouble
was caused by a "lack of firmness on the part of the agent."77
Conditions at the Verde Reservation were no more favorable than those at Camp Grant. The management of the
Indians collected at the former point proved to be relatively
easy immediately after Colyer's visit, but in December, 1871,
'when Crook inaugurated military contro,l, about five hundred
of the savages 'fled to the mountains. During the next 'few
months so many Of the others left that General Howard gave
no attention to the reserve on either of his trips. In fact,
when Dr. J. W. Williams, an appointee of the Dutch Reformed Church, arrived at the agency in July, 1872, the
absenGe of all but five of the tribesmen caused his transference to Date Creek. 78 Several bands, however, were
anxious for peace, and upon being told by Captain C. C.
Carr, the commandant at Camp Verde, to come in, obey
orders and receive rations, some eighty Yavapai and Tontos surrendered. Many others followed until it appeared
that all would return, but the killing of an important Tonto
prisoner caused every .Indian on the reserve to seek safety
in flight. During August; a considerable number of the
Indians, entirely unwilling to confine themselves to the
reserve, adopted a policy of coming in for rations and then
leaving. Crook solved the problem from the military stand76. Arizona Citizen, May 4, June 22, 29, Sept. 7, 14, 28, 1872; Howard to Bendell,
Aug. 29, 1872, I. 0., Ariz. Misc ... same to same, Oct. 17, 1872, H. C.
77.' Stevens to John Wasson, Nov. 15, Dec. 10, 1872, I. 0., M 127; Crook to
A. A. G., Dec. 13, 1872, A. G. 0., 286; Bendell to Walker, Dec. 5, 1872, S. L. B.,
vol. ii, pp. 2-3.
78. Williams to Walker, July 6, 1872, I. 0., W 91.
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point by ordering their arrest and daily muster ;79 yet in
taking such action he ended all possibilities for a peace
without war.
In contrast to their Verde kinsmen, the 900-1000 Yavapai who had collected at the Date Creek feeding post proved
to be especially cooperative for several months following
Colyer's mission. Submissive to military control from the
first they readily accepted, during July, 1872, the more rigid
discipline introduced by their new civil agent, Dr. Williams;
nevertheless, after more than one hundred hostiles had been
forced in, Williams reported that the troops were "the controlling factor with them."80
The agent improved his authority, however, until an
epidemic of fever, in August, forced him to permit several
hundred sick Indians to retire to the cool highlands. But,
once more in their former haunts, his charges decided
against ever. again submitting to reservationcontroI.81
Crook now came to his relief, and after arresting four of
the Loring massacre participants,82 inaugurated a sharp
campaign against the recalcitrants. This action, which resulted in the slaughter of seventy of their warriors, greatly
humbled the bands' haughty spirit, and by December, 1872,
the reserve was filled with more Indians than ever before. 83
Reservation control now appeared to bea reality among the
Yavapai at Camp Date Creek.
79. Carr to A .A. G., July 8, 1872, A. G. 0., 3188; same to same. Aug. 14, 1872,
ibid., 3573; Bendel! to Walker, Sept. 30, 1872, S. L. B., vol. i, p. 359; Crook to C. 0.,
Camp Verde, Sept. 24, 1872, 1. 0., B 360.
80.' Capt. Philip Dwyer to P. A., July 7, 1872, A. G. 0., 3084; Williams to Bendell, Sept. I, 187~, 42 Cong., 3 sess., H. E. D. no. 1, vol. i; p. 326.
81. Lt. W. J. Volkmar to A. A. G.. Sept. I, 1872, A. G. 0., 3815; James Grant to
C. 0., Date Creek, Sept. 6, 1872, ibid., 3908.
82. Several of the Date Creek Indians were involved in the crime. But of
greater importance to Crook was the fact that some of them had been reserve Indians
prior to the killing. Long convinced of the necessity of demonstrating to both malcontents and friendlies that none but truly peaceable tribesmen could find safety by
flight to reserves, the general went to the post on September 8, and succeeded, by a
clever stratagem, in making the arrests. Crook to A. A. G., Sept. 18, 1872, A. G. 0.,
4091; Prescott Miner, Sept. 14, 1872.
83. Crook to A. A. Goo Dec. 13, 1872, 1. 0., W 721; Capt. Julius Mason to A. A.
G., Oct. 27, 1872, A. G. 0., 4706; Williams to Bendel!, Dec. 23, 1872, 1. I., Ariz. Misc.
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Far to the east of the Date Creek Indians, the Coyotero bands of the White Mountains readily accepted reservation control as initiated by Colyer. Their favorable and
friendly attitude was doubtless due to the fact that their prescribed reservation necessitated no radical changes in their
habitat or mode of life; moreover, the advantage of receiving regular issues of rations made their life easier and less
precarious. Some difficulties arose during the first year
over the matter of subsistence, but officials felt that the
appointment of Dr. Soule would end all serious embarrassments. 84 And their views proved correct, for both Soule
and Bendell, by open market purchases and by advance
acceptance of beef deliveries, insured themselves against
any catastrophic exigencies. 85 The Indians, in addition to
behaving well, worked very energetically during the growing season of 1872, and at harvest time they sold more than
80,000 pounds of corn and fodder. At peace among themselves and .satisfied with their new regime, the only dangers
that threatened the Coyoteros near the end of the year were
those that might'arise in connection with Crook's impending
campaign. 80
Crook, of course, never warred against peaceable Indians, but in' planning aggressive action he invariably
eliminated all factors that might lead to abortive results.
Therefore, with the aim of not only protecting the Coyoteros,
but also of preventing the less docile bucks from joining
neighboring hostile groups, he directed on November 5, 1872,
that after ten days all Indians of both sexes were to concentrate within one mile of Camp Apache and submit to a daily
muster; also, that if any individual should fail to conform
84. Cf. BUpra. p. 60.
85. Soule to BendeII, Sept. 12, 1872, 1. 0., Ariz. Misc.; Bendell to Howard, Sept.
17. 1872. S. L. B., vol. i, pp. 317·318.
Soule accepted a six months supply of beef (700,000 lbs.) on October 10.
Soule to BendeII, Oct. 10. 1872, 1. 0., B' 567. No explanation was offered two months
later when he informed BendeIl that a further supply of cattle would be required from
New Mexico to meet the Indian needs. Soule to BendelI, Dec. 21. 1872. 1. 0., Ariz. Misc.
It is possible the contractor herded most of the supply in New Mexico.
86. Cf. infra, p. 69.
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after a reasonable time, he was not to be received except as
. a prisoner of war. 87
This drastic order, by ignoring Howard's promise to
the Indians of safety anywhere on the reservation,88 left the
bands exposed to summary punishment even though they
actually remained within the legal boundaries. It also left
them under exclusive military control except in the case of
issues. So naturally they became quite disturbed when
Major W. H. Brown arrived a few days later to enlist scouts
and personally enforce the order. They were unwilling to
leave their homes where some of their crops remained unharvested and where their stock would stray and become prey
to wild beasts. Besides, they were reluctant to enlist in
scout companies that might later be forced to fight against
their own bands. 89 The test tried them severely, but they
conformed with cheerfulness and cooperativeness.. As a
result, they were soon permitted to stay as far as ten miles
from the post.90
.
the
general
improvement that resulted from
Despite
Colyer's and Howard's efforts, the continuance of devastations and killings' proved that the peace policy per se was
insufficient as a method of Apache control.· Attacks were
numerous in both northern and southern Arizona during the
summer months of 1872, and conditions in the Prescott area
again resembled those that followed the Civil War. 91 Once
again the situation played into the hands of the advocates
of war, and naturally it strengthened the views of those
87.
88.

5, 1872.

462.

A. A. G. to G. 0., Fort Apache, Nov.
1. 0., B
Howard probably anticipated Crook's action, for he had already recommended
that the Department of Arizona be modified so that the White Mountain and Chiricahua reservations should be included in the District of New Mexico. Howard to Walker,
Nov.
1. 0., H
Grant, Belknap and Delano favored the change, but
deferred to Sherman who refused to give his approval when he found that Pope and
Crook were strongly opposed to the plan. Delano to Belknap, Dec.
A. G .0.,
Sherman to Belknap, Jan.
1. 0., W
Pedro to Howard, Nov.
I. 0., H
Miguel to Howard, Nov.
1872, ibid. C. E. Cooley wrote for the chiefs.
Bendell to ·Walker, Dec.
S. L. B., vol. ii, p.
Crook to A. A. G., May
A: G. 0.,
Arizona Miner, June
1872; Arizona Citizen, June
Aug.

7, 1872,

5055;
89.
90.
91.

383.

8, 1872,
18, 1872,

31, 1872,
28, 1872,
29,
31, 1872.

10, 1872,

721.
532;

2388;

19.

33.

29,
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persons who had always thought that the Apaches would
. have to be beaten into submission. 92
Crook believed from the time he first entered the territory that the Apaches would have to be reduced by war, but
with. great prudence he avoided all steps that might interfere with the success of the peace policy or cause an affront
to public opinion. 93 Sheridan entertained a similar view and
insisted that the government would be forced by public sentiment to "render every portion of our extensive frontier
safe for a citizen to travel over or occupy." He also said that
a policy was an erroneous one that taught the Indian what
was right, but failed to teach him that which was wrong.
Even the Washington officialdom, keenly alive to public
opinion, turned to a policy of war. 94
Crook, thus supported, now determined to press his
views with vigor. On 'September 21, 1872,.he informed the
war department that the Apaches on the reservations were
guilty of many of the murders and devastations that occurred
during the summer, and to. substantiate his incrimination,
sent in a long list of outrages which he branded as "a
ghastly commentary upon the result." Assured that humanity at last demanded the punishment of the "incorrigibily
--- - --- --.hostile," he requested the full cooperation of the civil agents
as compensation for his aid to their cause. 95
Superior officers approved his views. General Schofield announced on October 15, that "no course is open except
a vigorous and unremitting prosecution of the war, until
they are completely subdued, and the Department Com92. New York Hera.ld, Sept. 10, 1872.
93. Journal of Military Service Institution, vol. vii, p. 264. See Crook's saga..
cious remarks on the Apaches in his annual report for 1872. 42 Cong., 2 sess., H. E.
D., no. I, vol. ii, pp. 77-78.
94. Sheridan to A. G., Oct. 12, 1872, 42 Cong.,3 sess., H. E. D. no. 1, vol. ii,
p. 35; Walker to Delano, Nov. 1, 1872, 42 Cong., 3 sess., H. E. D. no. I, vol. i, P. 59.
Walker said in 1874 that Crook's operations were not of the 'nature of war, but of
discipline. F. A. Walker, The Indian Question (Boston, 1874), p. 45.
95. Crook to A. G., Sept. 21, 1872, 42 Cong., 3 sess., H. E. D. no. I, vol. ii, P. 79.
His list included forty-four killed and sixteen wounded.
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mander should have ample power of restriction over reservation Indians."96
Crook was fully prepared to make war, having used his
long periods of forced inaction in arranging every detail of
organization for the proper management of the impending
campaign. He planned his campaign in such a way that the
final crushing blows would be struck in the very center of
the hostile country-the Tonto Basin.. To accomplish this
end, preliminary campaigns were to be waged in regions
appendant to the main Indian country. These operations, he
felt, would greatly reduce the warring groups and result in
their final concentration in the basin proper. Then he
planned for several strong, swiftly-moving columns to converge upon them from various points along. the rim of the
basin. Crook,on his own part, intended to help organize the
columns and, with the campaign ·once under way, to move
from point to point along the whole periphery of the battle
area, exercising general supervision of movements,hut leaving the details of fighting to the respective officers. With the
idea of carrying war to the savages at a time when winter
weather would most handicap them, November 15 was designated for the start of the preliminary movements. 97
Promptly, three separate commands of one company of
cavalry and a detachment of forty Indian scouts each, left
Camp Hualpai to scout through to Camp Verde by way of
the San Francisco peaks and upper V:erde country. The
movement was unusually successful, and during the fifteen
days required to reach the post, the commands destroyed,
numerous winter rancherias, killed thirteen warriors and
captured several squaws. Meantime, Captain George F.
Price, at Date Creek, sent out two expeditions with instructions to clear the country of Indians on the west side of the
Verde as far down as Fort McDowell. Cooperating with him
96. Schofield to A. G., Oct. 18, 1872, A. G. 0., 4316.
97. Crook to A. A. G., Dec. 13, 1872, A. G. 0., 5312; Jour:..m of Military Service
11l8titutimt, vol. vii, pp. 262-264; E; G. Cattermole, Famous Frontiersmen, Pioneers
and Scouts (Chicago, 1883), p. 535.
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were two other commands sent from Camp Verde to scout
the Red Rock and Black Hills country. Price's commands
found many Indians scattered about between Date Creek
and Camp Verde, but they failed to effect any decisive actions. In contrast, the two associated commands killed thirteen warriors, captured three others and pushed many hostile bands eastward into the Tonto region. 98
Crook was even more active than his subordinates.
First at Camp Verde he completed his plans and then at
Camp Apache he began the enlistment of extra scout companies. The Coyotero bands, near the latter post, were quite
"feverish," but his "requirements were met with alacrity."
Although Crook noted some discrepancies in agency administration, time was too limited for investigation, and after
organizing one expedition to be commanded by Captain
George M. Randall, he pushed on to Camp Grant. Here he
completed arrangements for the organization of threeadditional expeditions, one of which was to take the field from
Camp McDowelI.99
The final campaign now arranged for, the nine columns
speedily penetrated into the haunts of the hostiles. Because
of the hazardous terrain over which the troops were forced
to operate, and also because of the decentralized nature of
Apache society, the fighting naturally developed into an innumerable number of small engagements. The columns from
Camp Grant, commanded by Captain W. H. Brown, did
some of the most effective and spectacular fighting of the
whole campaign, especially at the battle of the caves on Salt
River, where seventy-six Indians were killed and eighteen
others captured. 10o
Crook's other commands, although not so spectacular,
did equally effective work. During the three months fol98. Capt. A. H. Nickerson to A. A. G.• Dec. 26, 1872, A. G. 0., 172.
99. Crook to A. A. G., Dec. 13, 1872, op. cit.; Bourke, On the Border with
Crook, pp. 177-182.
.
100. Crook to A. G., Sept. 22, 1873,' I. 0., 355. This communication is Crook's
annual report for 1873. It arrived too late to be printed. See also Nickerson to A. A.
G., Jan. 11, 1873; A. G. 0., 213; Arizona Citizen, Sept. 20, 1873; Lockwood, The
Apache Indians, pp. 196-199.
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lowing the start of the campaign, they harried and decimated the hostile bands almost continuously. No accurate
figures are available, but it is probable that nearly three
hundred warriors were killed or received mortal wounds.
In addition, a considerable number of noncombatants suffered a like fate, and occasionally some warriors were taken
captive. All indications showed, at the end of February,
1873, that a few more punitive blows would result in a general surrender. 101
Punishment was not long deferred. About the middle
of March, some five hundred savages, who had evidently
taken refuge in the region between the Gila and the Colorado, began to hanT the Wickenburg country. Most of them
were thought to be on the verge of surrender, but one party
murdered three important citizens of the town itself. This
outrage resulted in a new offensive on the part of the troops,
and within a short time eighty warriors were killed and
thirty squaws captured. Such losses completely broke most
of the hostiles ;;; consequently, they fairly precipitated themselves to the reservations. 102 A sizeable group, however, fled
into the Tonto Basin, only to lose sixty-six warriors at the
hands of Major Randall's column. The major then pushed
relentlessly after the survivors, and a few days later succeeded in capturing the entire group of one hundred and
thirty-six souls on Turret Mountain, west of the Verde
River. 103
By the first of April, great numbers of Indians, earnestly
begging for peace, had collected near Camp Verde. General
Crook was also ready for peace, fearing that further slaughter might arouse other peace efforts in the East. He therefore went to the post, and "being satisfied that their professions were sincere," concluded a general peace by which the
101. Henden to Walker, Dec. 31, 1872, op. cit.; J. F. May to Howard, Jan. 27,
1873, 1. 0., H 836; Arizona Citizen, Mar; 1, 1873.
102. Henden to Comm., April I, 1873, S. L. B., vol. ii, p. 195; Arizona Miner, Mar.
15, 1873; Arizona Citizen, Mar. 22, 1873.
103. J. E. Roberts to Henden, April 29, 1873, 1. 0., Ariz. Misc.; Arizona Citizen,
April 12, 1873.
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bands agreed to stop all violence, to remain strictly upon
their reservations and to comply with all regulations of their
authorized agents. In turn, as long as they remained true
to the treaty terms, Crook promised to be responsible Jor
their protection. It was also agreed that after sufficient time
had elapsed to enable all renegades and straggling parties to
reach the reservation, the military was to pursue and force
them in, destroying all who refused to surrender. 104
104. General Orders no. 12, April 7, 1873. Army War College; Crook to A. A. G.,
April 12, 1873, A. G. 0., 1882.
On April 9, Crook complimented his troops as entitled "to a reputation second
to none in the annals of Indian warfare," and as having "finally closed an Indian war
that has been waged since the days of Cortez." General Orders no 14, April 9,
1872, Army War College.

(To be continued)

